The Theory of Regulatory Compliance* and Its Implications for Regulatory Science

The theory of regulatory compliance has appeared in a series of articles in the *Journal of Regulatory Science* and its spin off methodologies in other journals, *Child Care Quarterly, Child and Youth Forum, International Journal of Child Care and Education Policy, and Early Childhood Research Quarterly.* The theory has had a large impact on the human services, in particular the early care and education field. The purpose of this article is to reach a larger audience that may be representative of some of the other regulatory areas in the physical sciences, medical sciences and the economic sciences.

The organization of this section will first deal with the theory itself, explaining it in simple, non-mathematical terms and its implications for public policy and licensing decision making. Then we will delve into the implications and spin off methodologies of the theory, such as differential monitoring, risk assessment rule formulation, key predictor rules, the uncertainty-certainty matrix, ceiling effect, and dichotomization of skewed licensing data distributions.

Regulatory science is a relatively new science appearing on the scene in the past 20 years. Regulatory compliance and the licensing of programs, industries, etc. has been around for quite some time. The first licensing law was passed over 100 years ago governing orphanages in Pennsylvania. But as is clearly evident the science behind licensing and regulatory compliance lagged by many decades. Licensing grew at a

slow pace in the human services during the twentieth century and it was not until the late 1960's to early 1970's that human services began to really expand and grow in terms of the number of programs. Other industries grew in a corresponding way with most of the growth in later portions of the previous century. The pharmaceutical industry is a perfect example of this. In fact, regulatory science has really grown out of this need to regulate the pharmacological industry. The Food and Drug Administration is the leading federal agency in pursuing the expansion and dissemination of regulatory science with the establishment of national centers across the USA.

Let me provide some historical context to the theory and how it has evolved over the past several decades based upon empirical evidence. The original standard paradigm when it came to regulatory compliance and its relationship to program quality was that there is a linear relationship between the two components. As one goes up, the other goes up in a corresponding way. From a public policy standpoint this made a great deal of sense. Any licensing agency wants to see increased quality of services based upon their rules and regulations. I will only be addressing the human services, in particular early care and education programs, that is where all the research has been done. In the future, it will be necessary to determine if what is being described in the human services applies to industries outside of this domain.

The problem with the standard paradigm was that it was not based on empirical evidence but rather on expert opinion and anecdotal evidence, but there were no well-designed studies that looked at the relationship between regulatory compliance and program quality in any of the human services. Fast

forward to the 1970's as the number of early care and education programs were increasing dramatically because of the influx of federal dollars as part of the Great Society and the creation of Head Start and a major expansion of child care. It became clear that the standard paradigm which included doing case studies as their major means for data collection was not going to be a viable measurement strategy. This ushered in a new form of program monitoring and data collection called Instrument based Program Monitoring which utilized checklists, tools, and instruments for their data collection and licensing measurement.

Another thing that happened also in the movement from qualitative to quantitative measurement was that larger studies could be done to evaluate the relationship between regulatory compliance and program quality. Finally, there would be a chance to collect scientific data on this relationship and prove the linear relationship between regulatory compliance and program quality. When these studies were done, sure enough, when low levels of regulatory compliance which essentially means rule or regulatory violations are being found and comparing these data to the overall quality of the respective programs there was a direct linear relationship and that continued to be so right up to substantial regulatory compliance which means being 98-99% in compliance with all rules and regulations. However, then a very interesting change occurred in moving from substantial regulatory compliance to full (100%) regulatory compliance in which the respective programs did not follow the linear relationship and there was a plateauing or a ceiling effect in which it was difficult to distinguish the quality of programs that were in substantial vs full regulatory compliance. It was in some cases

in subsequent studies (2010's) which replicated these initial studies in the 1970's where the relationship followed more of a diminishing returns type of curve. Not always but definitely a ceiling effect was always observed in the data.

These results obviously upset the proverbial public policy apple cart and the standard paradigm which was based upon a linear model and that licenses should only be issued to those programs that were in full regulatory compliance, no exceptions. The data did not support this claim nor the public policy. Substantial regulatory compliance was clearly demonstrating that these programs were providing the same level of quality care as those programs that were in full regulatory compliance and in some cases were doing an even better job of providing quality care. This is the major finding of the theory of regulatory compliance demonstrating these diminishing returns and/or ceiling effect and introduces substantial regulatory compliance as a licensing decision point rather than relying only on full 100% regulatory compliance. The original paradigm still holds in that regulatory compliance is very accurate in distinguishing between low and higher quality, but it is not as accurate when it comes to distinguishing quality at the substantial regulatory compliance and the full regulatory compliance levels.

The following figure/graphic (Figure 1) depicts the relationship between regulatory compliance levels and program quality scores. This graphic is a summary depiction of the various studies that have been completed starting in the 1970's through to the 2010's in looking at this relationship. The graphic also shows the relationship to several other concepts that will be addressed in this article, dealing with differential and integrative monitoring, key indicator predictor

rules, risk assessment rules, nominal data, and dichotomization of data. All these additional concepts will be dealt with in the following sections of this article.



Figure 1: Theory of Regulatory Compliance

Let's turn our attention to some of the spin off methodologies and approaches from the theory of regulatory compliance. The first one to consider is differential monitoring because it is the most significant in altering the licensing landscape in how programs are monitored, reviewed, and inspected. Differential monitoring is about focused reviews rather than a one size fits all approach which again was predominant in the standard program monitoring paradigm. Because the theory of regulatory compliance introduced the importance of

substantial regulatory compliance into the new and revised paradigm when it comes to program monitoring, it ushered in more targeted inspections or reviews which focused on key predictor rules or rules that placed clients at particular risk, more so than other rules and regulations. There was also part of this new paradigm the notion of reviewing programs less often but that was removed from the differential monitoring approach because all the research into program monitoring indicated that just reviewing the program more frequently brought about more positive change in regulatory compliance and quality.

In Figure 2, the differential monitoring approach is depicted along with the definitions of each of the methodologies which are part of the approach.

Risk assessment is one of the methodologies which is part of the differential monitoring approach. It focuses on those specific rules and regulations which place clients/children are greatest risk of morbidity or mortality. These are the rules that deal with supervision, hazardous materials being in locked cabinets, etc. Generally, jurisdictions/states/provinces can identify these rules through an empirical weighting approach where a Likert Scale is used to weight each rule or regulation on the basis of this morbidity and mortality dimension. Those rules that are determined to be highly weighted are part of the risk assessment rules and are to be measured in every differential monitoring focused review or inspection. There are no exceptions to this.

Key indicator predictor rules is the other methodology which is part of the differential monitoring approach. Key indicator or predictor rules statistically predict overall regulatory

compliance and are a very efficient metric for determining the overall regulatory compliance of a facility but in a summary, targeted, and focused fashion without having to do a comprehensive inspection in looking at all the rules and regulations.



Figure 2: Differential Monitoring Approaches

Using the combined methodologies of key indicator predictor rules and risk assessment rules makes the differential monitoring approach the most effective and efficient program monitoring system because it focuses on those rules where clients/children may be injured while at the same time predicting overall regulatory compliance with all the rules. It is the perfect balance of effectiveness and efficiency. This is the highly recommended way to utilize differential monitoring, but many jurisdictions/states/provinces use either the risk assessment or the key indicator methodologies, few are utilizing both. Hopefully this will change as the regulatory science field matures over the upcoming decades.

Let's move from the theory, program monitoring approaches and methodologies to the actual measurement of licensing data. Licensing data are at the nominal measurement level. This is important which will be pointed out shortly in the specific approach being taken here. The approach we will take is to use the Confusion Matrix, which is a well-known metric in the decision-making computer research literature and refocus it for regulatory science within the context of the definition of regulatory compliance and licensing measurement. It will also deal with the policy implications of this particular metric. It is being proposed that this new Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix (UCM) is a fundamental building block to licensing decision making. The 2 x 2 matrix has been written about a great deal in the development of the various methodologies described above and is the center piece for determining key indicator predictor rules, but it is also a core conceptual framework in licensing measurement and ultimately in program monitoring and reviews.

The reason for selecting this matrix is the nature of licensing data, it is binary or nominal in measurement. Either a rule/regulation is in-compliance or out of compliance. Presently most jurisdictions deal with regulatory compliance measurement in this nominal level or binary level. There is to be no gray area, this is a clear distinction in making a licensing decision about regulatory compliance. The UCM also takes the concept of Inter-Rater Reliability (IRR) a step further in introducing an uncertainty dimension that is very important in licensing decision making which is not as critical when calculating IRR. It is moving from an individual metric to a group metric involving regulatory compliance with rules.

The key pieces to the UCM are the following: the decision (D) regarding regulatory compliance and actual state (S) of regulatory compliance. Plus (+) = In-compliance or Minus (-) = Out of compliance. So, let's build the matrix:

Table 1: Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix (UCM) Logic Model

UCM Matrix Logic		**Decision (D) Regarding**	**Regulatory Compliance**
		(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance
Actual State (S) of	(+) In Compliance	Agreement	Disagreement
Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance	Disagreement	Agreement

The above UCM matrix demonstrates when agreement and disagreement occur which establishes a level of certainty (Agreement Cells) or uncertainty (Disagreement Cells). In a perfect world, there would only be agreements and no disagreements between the decisions made about regulatory compliance and the actual state of regulatory compliance. But from experience, this is not the case based upon reliability

testing done in the licensing research field in which a decision is made regarding regulatory compliance with a specific rule or regulation and then that is verified by a second observer who generally is considered the measurement standard.

Disagreements raise concerns in general, but the disagreements are of two types: false positives and false negatives. A false positive is when a decision is made that a rule/regulation is out of compliance when it is in compliance. Not a good thing but its twin disagreement is worse where with false negatives it is decided that a rule/regulation is in compliance when it is out of compliance. False negatives need to be avoided because they place clients at extreme risk, more so than a false positive. False positives should also be avoided but it is more important to deal with the false negatives first before addressing the false positives.

The next logical question after dealing with the measurement issues of licensing data and the fact that it is measured nominally is how best to deal with a data distribution which is severely skewed. In Figure 1, dichotomization was introduced in the graphic in depicting the differences between high and low regulatory compliance. As presented above in attempting to eliminate false negatives and reduce false positives, the same can be done by dichotomizing the licensing data distribution in order to accentuate the differences between low regulatory compliance and substantial + full regulatory compliance. Dichotomization of data is generally not recommended from a statistical point of view but because of the nature of licensing data being measured at the nominal level and being so severely skewed, it is warranted.

Regulatory Compliance has been always approached as an all or none phenomenon, whether a rule is in-compliance, or it is not. There is no in-between or shades of gray or partial compliance. This worked when the prevailing paradigm was that full regulatory compliance and program quality were a linear relationship. This was the assumption but not empirically verified until the later 1970's-1980's. When this assumption was put to an empirical test, it did not hold up but rather a curvilinear relationship between regulatory compliance and program quality was discovered. This upset the prevailing paradigm and suggested we needed a new approach to addressing the relationship between regulatory compliance and program quality as mentioned earlier in this article.

It became clear after these findings in the 1970's-80's and then in the 2010's when replication studies were completed that substantial regulatory compliance could not be ignored based upon this new theory of regulatory compliance in which substantial compliance acted as a "sweet spot" of best outcomes or results when comparing regulatory compliance and program quality scores. The nominal metric needed to be revised and more of an ordinal metric was to be its replacement. Because now it wasn't just being in or out of compliance, but it mattered which rules were in or out of compliance and how they were distributed. This revised application involved aggregate rules and does not apply to individual rule scoring. The studies completed between 1970's and 2010's involved aggregate rules and not individual rules. To determine if the nominal to ordinal metric needs to be revised still needs empirical data to back this change.

The introduction of substantial compliance into the regulatory compliance measurement strategy moved the field from an instrument-based program monitoring into a more differential monitoring approach. With differential monitoring this approach considered which rules and how often reviews should be done. Also, a new Regulatory Compliance Scale was proposed to consider the importance of substantial compliance based upon the regulatory compliance theory of diminishing returns. As this Regulatory Compliance Scale has evolved within the licensing health and safety field it needs further revision in which program quality can be infused into the decision making related to individual rules. Remember that the original studies were concerned about rules in the aggregate and not individual rules. It has now become apparent that in dealing with the infusion of quality into rule formulation, a return to the individual rule approach makes the most sense.

The next iteration of the Regulatory Compliance Scale will contain the following categories: Exceeding Full compliance, Full compliance, Substantial compliance, and Mediocre compliance to adjust for the infusion of the quality element. This differs slightly from the original aggregate rule Regulatory Compliance Scale where the categories were Full compliance, Substantial compliance, Mediocre compliance, and Low compliance where only licensing health and safety elements were considered (see the Table 2 below which depicts the regulatory compliance scales and program monitoring systems side by side).

Without the theory of regulatory compliance, differential and integrative monitoring would not be needed because regulatory compliance would have had a linear relationship

with program quality and full compliance would have been the ultimate goal. There would have been no need for targeted rule enforcement or reviews because all rules would have had an equal weight when it came to protecting clients and any individual rule would have predicted overall compliance. But it "just ain't so" as it is said. The need to make adjustments is brought about by the theory and it has not been the same ever since.

Table 2: Regulatory Compliance Scales and Program Monitoring Systems

Scoring Level	**Individual Rule**		**Aggregate Rules**	**Individual Rule**
Scale	**Instrument based**	***Scale***	**Differential**	**Integrated**
7	Full Compliance	7	Full Compliance	Exceeds Compliance
-	---	5	Substantial	Full Compliance
-	---	3	Mediocre	Substantial
1	Out of Compliance	1	Low	Mediocre/Low

The above table attempts to summarize in tabular form the previous paragraphs in describing the relationship between program monitoring and licensing measurement scaling via a proposed Regulatory Compliance Scale. As one can see this moves the paradigm from a nominal to an ordinal measurement rubric and depicts the differences in the measurement focus either at the individual rule or aggregate rules scoring levels. It also considers the significance of substantial compliance given the theory of regulatory compliance in which substantial compliance focus is a "*sweet spot*" phenomenon as identified in the regulatory science research literature. It is hoped that the regulatory science field takes these paradigm shifts into consideration in moving

forward with building licensing decision making systems and how licenses are issued to facilities.

As a final footnote, keep in mind that the theory of regulatory compliance applies to the relationship between regulatory compliance and program quality and does not apply to regulatory compliance in and of itself related to health and safety. When dealing with regulatory compliance, full compliance is the ultimate goal with individual rules and in determining which rules are predictive rules. It is the preferred methodology in order to eliminate false negatives and decreasing false positives in making licensing decisions related to regulatory compliance.

So, what are the takeaways from the theory of regulatory compliance and its implications for regulatory science.

1) The theory of regulatory compliance has ushered in a new paradigm demonstrating the importance of substantial compliance and putting it on equal footing with full 100% regulatory compliance.
2) Regulatory compliance will not get us to quality on its own, rules and regulations need an infusion of quality so there is the need to balance regulatory compliance and quality standards in any future promulgation of rules and regulations.
3) How does all this fit together? An Early Childhood Program Quality Improvement and Indicator Model has been proposed to build off the results of the theory of regulatory compliance and to build a robust program monitoring system that both differentiates and integrates. See the following Figure 3 which provides a logic model for how the model would play out.



$$\sum CI \times \sum PQ \Rightarrow \sum RA + \sum KI \Rightarrow \sum DM + \sum PD \Rightarrow CO$$

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Figure 3: Early Childhood Program Quality Improvement and Indicator Model

4) All the studies and research presented in this article are from the human services area. It will be interesting to see if other industries in the medical, scientific, and economic arenas demonstrate the same type of relationship between regulatory compliance in their respective industries and sets of rules and regulations and the ultimate quality of the products they produce.
5) The ceiling effect, diminishing returns, plateauing all depict a curvilinear relationship rather than a linear relationship. As additional studies are completed, this relationship needs to be fine-tuned. Hopefully moving from a nominal measurement strategy to one that is

more ordinally based via the Regulatory Compliance Scale will help to fine-tune that relationship.

6) The idiosyncratic nature of licensing data distributions needs to be dealt with statistically because of severe skewness in the data which limits the analytical frames that can be used. Various weighting schemes are being attempted in order to build in more variance in the data and the infusion of more quality standards into rule formulation should help.
7) Hopefully, this article has given the reader the necessary background to understand this new paradigm for licensing measurement and monitoring systems with all its intricacies and foibles.

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Note:

In the regulatory science research literature and in this section, both the theory of regulatory compliance as well as the regulatory compliance theory of diminishing returns are used interchangeably.

The Relationship between Early Care & Education Quality Initiatives and Regulatory Compliance

Over the past couple of decades there has been many early care and education initiatives, such as Quality Rating and Improvement Systems (QRIS), Professional Development, Training, Technical Assistance, Accreditation, and Pre-K programs to just name a few. Validation and evaluation studies have begun to appear in the research literature, but in these studies, there has been few empirical demonstrations of the relationship between these various quality initiatives and their impact on regulatory compliance or a comparison to their respective regulatory compliance. This brief technical research note will provide examples of these comparisons taken from the Early Childhood Program Quality Improvement and Indicator Model (ECPQI2M) Data Base maintained at the Research Institute for Key Indicators (RIKIIlc).

I have written about this back in 2014 (Fiene, 2014) in how the various quality initiatives were having a positive impact on the early care and education delivery system but at that point regulatory compliance data were not available. Today, in 2019, with many changes and developments in state data systems, this is no longer the case. Now it is possible to explore the relationships between data from the various quality initiatives and licensing. Several states in multiple service delivery systems have provided replicable findings in which I feel comfortable reporting out about the relationships across the data systems.

What we now know is that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between regulatory compliance and

moving up the QRIS Quality Levels. In other words, facilities have higher compliance in the higher QRIS Quality Levels and lower compliance in the lower QRIS Levels or if they do not participate in their state's respective QRIS ($F = 5.047 – 8.694$; $p < .0001$). Other quality initiatives, such as being accredited, shows higher compliance with licensing rules than those facilities that are not accredited ($t = 2.799 - 3.853$; $p < .005 - .0001$).

This is a very important result clearly demonstrating the positive relationship between regulatory compliance and quality initiatives. I have some additional state data sets that I will add to the ECPQI2M data base and will continue to analyze these relationships.

Regulatory Compliance, Licensing, and Monitoring Measurement Principles: Rule Compliance Versus Rule Performance

The purpose of this short paper is to delineate the parameters of regulatory compliance, licensing and monitoring measurement principles (throughout this paper the term "regulatory compliance" will be used to encompass these principles). Regulatory compliance is very unique when it comes to measuring it because it is very different from other measurement systems and this impacts how one uses various statistical analyses. In this paper, the limitations of the measurement system will be highlighted with potential solutions that have been devised over the past several decades. Hopefully this paper will add to the measurement and

statistical analysis licensing research literature. It is meant for those agency staff who are responsible for designing regulatory compliance, licensing and monitoring systems. Its focus is the human services but the basic principles can be applied to any standards-based system that is based upon a compliance or performance model.

The organization of this paper is as follows. First, let's introduce what is included when we talk about measurement principles for regulatory compliance, licensing and monitoring systems. Second, provide examples that should be familiar to most individuals who have been involved in the human services, in particular the early care and education field. Third, what are the limitations of these various systems that have been identified in the research literature. Fourth, what are some potential solutions to these limitations. And, fifth, what are the next steps and where do we go to build reliable and valid measurement systems dealing with regulatory compliance, licensing, and program monitoring as these relate to the human services delivery system.

So, what is included in this approach. I can be any rule, regulation, or standard based measurement system. Generally, these systems are focused on a nominally based system, sometimes they will be ordinally based. By a nominally based system, either the facility being assessed is in compliance with a particular set of rules, regulations, or standards or it is not. In an ordinally based system, a facility may attain a score on a Likert scale, such as 1 through 5 where 1 is non-optimal and 5 is excellent. These types of measurement scales involve a performance component and are not limited to more of a compliance focus as is the case with a nominally based system. These distinctions are important as one will see later

in this paper when it comes to the selection of the appropriate statistics to measure data distributions and the subsequent analyses that can be undertaken.

What are examples of these types of systems? For nominally based systems, just about all the licensing systems in the USA, Canada and beyond employ this type of measurement strategy. As has been said in the previous paragraph, either there is compliance or there is not. It is very black or white, there are not shades of gray. For ordinally based systems, these systems are a bit more diverse. Accreditation, Quality Rating and Improvement Systems (QRIS), the new Head Start Grantee Performance Management System (GPMS), the Environmental Rating Scales, and the CLASS are all examples of ordinally based systems based upon a Likert type measurement system. There are many others, but as a research psychologist whose total career (50 years) has been spent in early care and education, this has been the focus of my research.

The limitations of the above systems are numerous and, in some ways, are difficult to find solutions. In the past, these measurement systems have focused more on the descriptive aspects of data distributions rather than attempting to be predictive or inferential. The first major limitation of the data from regulatory compliance systems is the fact that the data distribution is markedly skewed. What does skew data mean? Most data distributions are normally distributed with very few occurrences at the extremes with the majority of the cases in the middle section of the measurement scale. IQ is an example of a normally distributed data distribution. In a skew data distribution, the majority of data are at one end of the data distribution, either at the positive end or the negative end of

the distribution. With regulatory compliance data, it is at the positive end with the majority of facilities being in full or 100% compliance with the rules. Very few of the facilities are at the negative end of the distribution.

What is the big deal? The big deal is that statistically we are limited in what we can do with the data analyses because the data are not normally distributed which is an assumption when selecting certain statistical tests. Basically, we need to employ non-parametric statistical analyses to deal with the data. The other real limitation is in the data distribution itself. It is very difficult to distinguish between high and mediocre facilities. It is very easy to distinguish between high and low performing facilities because of the variance between the high performing facilities and the low performing facilities. However, that is not the case between high and mediocre preforming facilities. Since the majority of facilities are either in full or substantial compliance with the rules, they are all co-mingled in a very tight band with little data variance. This makes it very difficult to distinguish differences in the facilities. And this only occurs with regulatory compliance data distributions. As will be pointed later in this paper, this is not the case with the second measurement system to be addressed dealing with ordinal measurement systems.

There is also a confounding factor in the regulatory compliance data distributions which has been termed the theory of regulatory compliance or the law of regulatory compliance diminishing returns. In this theory/law, when regulatory compliance data are compared to program quality data, a non-linear relationship occurs where either the facilities scoring at the substantial compliance level score better than the fully compliant facilities or there is a plateau effect and

there is no significant difference between the two groups: substantial or fully compliant facilities when they are measured on a program quality scale. From a public policy stand point, this result really complicates how best to promulgate compliance with rules. This result has been found repeatedly in early care and education programs as well as in other human service delivery systems. It is conjectured that the same result will be found in any regulatory compliance system.

Another limitation of regulatory compliance data is the fact that it is measured at a nominal level. There is no interval scale of measurement and usually not even an ordinal level of measurement. As mentioned above, either a facility is in compliance or not. From a statistical analytical view, again this limits what can be done with the data. In fact, it is probably one of the barriers for researchers who would like to conduct analyses on these data but are concerned about the robustness of the data and their resulting distributions.

Let's turn our attention to potential solutions to the above limitations in dealing with regulatory compliance data. One potential solution and this is based upon the theory of regulatory compliance in which substantial compliance is the threshold for a facility to be issued a license or certificate of compliance. When this public policy determination is allowed, it opens up a couple of alternate strategies for program monitoring and licensing reviews. Because of the theory of regulatory compliance/law of regulatory compliance diminishing returns, abbreviated or targeted monitoring reviews are possible, differential monitoring or inferential monitoring as it has been documented in the literature. This research literature on differential monitoring has been

dominated by two approaches: licensing key indicators and weighted risk assessments.

A second solution to the above limitations deals with how we handle the data distribution. Generally, it is not suggested to dichotomize data distributions. However, when the data distribution is significantly skewed as it is with regulatory compliance, it is an appropriate adjustment to the data. By essentially having two groups, those facilities that are in full compliance and those facilities that are not in full compliance with the rules. In some cases, the fully compliant group can be combined with those facilities that are in substantial compliance but this should only be employed when there are not sufficient fully compliant facilities which is hardly never the case since population data and not sampled data are available from most jurisdictions. When data samples were drawn and the total number of facilities were much smaller, substantial compliant facilities were used as part of the grouping strategy. The problem in including them was that it increased the false negative results. With them not being included, it is possible to decrease and eliminate false negatives. An additional methodological twist is also to eliminate and not use the substantial compliant facilities at all in the subsequent analyses which again helps to accentuate the difference scores between the two groups of highly compliant and low compliant scoring facilities.

The next steps for building valid and reliable regulatory compliance systems are drawing upon what has been learned from more ordinally based measurement systems and applying this measurement structure to regulatory compliance systems. As such, the move would be away from a strict nominally based measurement to more ordinal in which more of a

program quality element is built into each rule. By utilizing this paradigm shift, additional variance should be built into the measurement structure. So rather than having a Yes/No result, there would be a gradual Likert type (1-5) scale built in to measure "rule performance" rather than "rule compliance" where a "1" indicates non-compliance or a violation of the specific rule. A "5" would indicate excellent performance as it relates to the specific rule. A "3" would indicate compliance with the specific rule meeting the specifics of the rule but not exceeding it in any way.

This paradigm shift has led to the creation of Quality Rating and Improvement Systems (QRIS) throughout the USA because of a frustration to move licensing systems to more quality focused. The suggestion being made here is to make this movement based upon the very recent developments in designing such systems as is the case with Head Start monitoring. Head Start GPMS is developing an innovative Likert based ordinal system which incorporates compliance and performance into their monitoring system. Other jurisdictions can learn from this development. It is not being suggested as a replacement for QRIS or accreditation or ERS/CLASS assessments but as a more seamless transition from licensing to these various assessments. As indicated by the theory of regulatory compliance and the law of regulatory compliance diminishing returns, this relationship between licensing and program quality is not linear. By having this monitoring system approach in place, it may be able to reintroduce more of a linear relationship between licensing and program quality.

What is the Relationship between Regulatory Compliance and Complaints in a Human Services Licensing System?

Within licensing measurement and the validation of licensing systems it is particularly difficult to have specific outcome metrics that can be measured within a human services licensing system. The purpose of this technical research note is to propose a potential solution to this problem.

Probably the most accurate measures of licensing outcomes focuses on improvements in the health and safety of clients within human services licensed facilities, such as: fewer injuries (safety) or higher levels of immunizations (health). Another measure related to client satisfaction is the number of complaints reported about a licensed facility by clients and the general public. The advantage of using complaints is that this form of monitoring is generally always part of an overall licensing system. In other words, the state/provincial licensing agency is already collecting these data. It is just a matter of utilizing these data in comparing the number of complaints to overall regulatory compliance.

The author had the opportunity to have access to these data, complaint and regulatory compliance data in a mid-Western state which will be reported within this technical research note. There are few empirical demonstrations of this relationship within the licensing research literature. The following results are based upon a very large sample of family child care homes (N = 2000+) over a full year of licensing reviews.

The results of comparing the number of complaints and the respective regulatory compliance levels proved to show a rather significant relationship ($r = .47$; $p < .0001$). This result is the first step in attempting to understand this relationship as well as developing a methodology and analysis schema since directionality (e.g., did the complaint occur before or after the regulatory compliance data collection?) can play a key role in the relationship (this will be developed more fully in a future technical research note). The focus of this research note was to determine if any relationship existed between regulatory compliance and complaint data and if it is worth pursuing.

It appears that looking more closely at the relationship between complaint and regulatory compliance data is warranted. It may provide another means of validating the fourth level of validation studies as proposed by Zellman and Fiene's OPRE Research Brief (Zellman, G. L. & Fiene, R. (2012). Validation of Quality Rating and Improvement Systems for Early Care and Education and School-Age Care, Research-to-Policy, Research-to-Practice Brief OPRE 2012-29. Washington, DC: Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) in which four approaches to validation are delineated for Quality Rating and Improvement Systems (QRIS). This author has taken this framework and applied it to licensing systems (Fiene (2014). Validation of Georgia's Core Rule Monitoring System, Georgia Department of Early Care and Learning) and more recently proposed as the framework for Washington State's Research Agenda (Stevens & Fiene (2018). Validation of the Washington State's Licensing and Monitoring System, Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families).

The Implications in Regulatory Compliance Measurement When Moving from Nominal to Ordinal Scaling

The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternate paradigm for regulatory compliance measurement in moving from a nominal to an ordinal scale measurement strategy. Regulatory compliance measurement is dominated by a nominal scale measurement system in which rules are either in compliance or out of compliance. There are no gradients for measurement within the present licensing measurement paradigm. It is very absolute. Either a rule is in full compliance to the letter of the law or the essence of the regulation or it is not. An alternate paradigm borrowing from accreditation and other program quality systems is to establish an ordinal scale measurement system which takes various gradients of compliance into account. With this alternate paradigm, it offers an opportunity to begin to introduce a quality element into the measurement schema. It also allows to take into consideration both risk and prevalence data which are important in rank ordering specific rules.

So how would this look from a licensing decision making vantage point. Presently, in licensing measurement, licensing decisions are made at the rule level in which each rule is either in or out of compliance in the prevailing paradigm. Licensing summaries with corrective actions are generated from the regulatory compliance review. It is a nominal measurement system being based upon Yes/No responses. The alternate measurement paradigm I am suggesting in this paper is one that is more ordinal in nature where we expand the Yes/No response to include gradients of the particular rule. In the next

paragraph, I provide an example of a rule that could be measured in moving from a nominal to ordinal scale measurement schema.

Rather than only measuring a rule in an all or none fashion, this alternate paradigm provides a more relative mode of measurement at an ordinal level. For example, with a professional development or training rule in a particular state which requires, let's say, 6 hours of training for each staff person. Rather than having this only be 6 hours in compliance and anything less than this is out of compliance, let's have this rule be on a relative gradient in which any amount of hours above the 6 hours falls into a program quality level and anything less than the 6 hours falls out of compliance but at a more severe level depending on how far below the 6 hours and how many staff do not meet the requirement (prevalence). Also throw in a specific weight which adds in a risk factor and we have a paradigm that is more relative rather than absolute in nature.

From a math modeling perspective, the 1 or 0 format for a Yes or No response becomes -2, -1, 0, +1, +2 format. This is more similar to what is used in accreditation systems where 0 equals Compliance and -1 and -2 equals various levels of Non-Compliance in terms of severity and/or prevalence. The +1 and +2 levels equal value added to the Compliance level by introducing a Quality Indicator. This new formatting builds upon the compliance vs non-compliance dichotomy (C/NC) but now adds a quality indicator (QI) element. By adding this quality element, we may be able to eliminate or at least lessen the non-linear relationship between regulatory compliance with rules and program quality scores as measured by the

Environmental Rating Scales (ERS) and CLASS which is the essence of the Theory of Regulatory Compliance (TRC). It could potentially make this a more linear relationship by not having the data as skewed as it has been in the past.

By employing this alternate paradigm, it is a first demonstration of the use of the Key Indicator Methodology in both licensing and quality domains. The Key Indicator Methodology has been utilized a great deal in licensing but in few instances in the program quality domain. For example, over the past five years, I have worked with approximately 10 states in designing Licensing Key Indicators but only one state with Quality Key Indicators from their QRIS – Quality Rating and Improvement System. This new paradigm would combine the use in both. It also takes advantage of the full ECPQI2M – Early Childhood Program Quality Improvement and Indicator Model by blending regulatory compliance with program quality standards.

A major implication in moving from a nominal to an ordinal regulatory compliance measurement system is that it presents the possibility of combining licensing and quality rating and improvement systems into one system via the Key Indicator Methodology. By having licensing indicators and now quality indicators that could be both measured by licensing inspectors, there would be no need to have two separate systems but rather one that applies to everyone and becomes mandated rather than voluntary. It could help to balance both effectiveness and efficiency by only including those standards and rules that statistically predict regulatory compliance and quality and balancing risk assessment by adding high risk rules.

I will continue to develop this scale measurement paradigm shift in future papers but wanted to get this idea out to the regulatory administration field for consideration and debate. This will be a very controversial proposal since state regulatory agencies have spent a great deal of resources on developing free standing QRIS which build upon licensing systems. This alternate paradigm builds off my Theory of Regulatory Compliance's key element of relative vs absolute measurement and linear vs non-linear relationships. Look for additional information about this on my website RIKI Institute Blog - https://rikinstitute.com/blog/.

So Which Is Better: Differential Monitoring & Abbreviated Inspections or Comprehensive Inspections?

During 2019 and 2020, several validation studies have been or are being completed in the states of Washington, Indiana, and in the Province of Saskatchewan. These validation studies are determining if the key indicator and risk assessment methodologies are valid approaches to conducting abbreviated inspections in comparison to more comprehensive inspections in which all rules are assessed. These abbreviated inspections are a form of differential or targeted monitoring. This technical research note focuses on the empirical evidence to determine the efficacy of these approaches, are they better than doing comprehensive reviews when it comes to health and safety outcomes.

When the key indicator and risk assessment methods were originally proposed in the 1980's, an outcome validation study was completed in Pennsylvania during 1985 – 1987 by Kontos

and Fiene to determine what impact those methods had on children's development. In that original study, it was determined that the Child Development Program Evaluation Indicator Checklist (CDPEIC) was more effective and efficient in predicting child development outcomes than the more comprehensive Child Development Program Evaluation. In fact, the CDPEIC and the accompanying Caregiver Observation Scale (COFAS) were as effective and more efficient than the ECERS – Early Childhood Environmental Rating Scale in that study.

Fast forward to 2019 – 2020, in the province of Saskatchewan, Canada, and a similar study was undertaken but in this case the outcomes were more based upon health and safety rather than child development developmental outcomes. In this case, again the key indicator and risk assessment tool was both a more effective and efficient model over the more comprehensive inspection approach giving credence to utilizing differential monitoring with abbreviated inspections.

In both of the above validation studies involving either child development assessment outcomes or health & safety outcomes, a 16 to 28% increase in effectiveness was observed in the outcome data. In the abbreviated or targeted inspections, 33% of the total rules or less are used to make the determination of regulatory compliance. It is like having the best of both worlds when it comes to effectiveness (16 – 28% increase in outcomes) and in efficiency (66% fewer rules being used). These studies help to validate the use of differential monitoring as a viable alternative to the more comprehensive one-size-fits-all monitoring reviews.

The Dichotomization and Bi-Polarization of the Matrix Data Base

This latest technical note updates the thresholds for the high and low groups within the key indicator matrix. This technical note is based upon the latest studies during the early 2015 time frame in which very large data distributions were available to test certain criteria with the key indicator methodology. Because of the extreme skewness present in licensing/regulatory data, certain statistical adjustments need to be made so that the analyses performed reflect the distribution of data. One of these statistical adjustments is the dichotomization of data which is generally not suggested with the exception of very skewed data. Since licensing data are so skewed, this adjustment has been used throughout the key indicator methodology. However, an additional adjustment is now warranted given not only the skewness of data but also because of the data being nominal in nature. This additional adjustment I am calling the bipolarization of data in order to accentuate the differences between the high and low groups within the key indicator matrix.

I have tested several data sets utilizing bi-polarization and found that the results are more significant with its use than without its use. Please keep in mind that licensing data is very different from other forms of data found in the early care and education (ECE) research literature. It is not like the ERS or CLASS data which is more normally distributed and lends itself to more parametric statistical analyses. Licensing data are nominal in nature and always very skewed which means that more non-parametric methods are warranted, such as phi coefficient and dichotomization of data. An example of how this actually works may help.

Licensing data are measured as either being in or out of compliance. There is no middle ground, it is not measured on a Likert scale. Therefore it is nominal in nature, either it is all there or it is not. Licensing data are also measured in the sense that all rules are created equally, in other words, they all have the same weight or importance, such as 1 = compliance; 0 = non-compliance. Being in full 100% compliance which means 0 violations is the goal of a regulatory/licensing system. One does not want to see many violations of the rules because this will place children at risk of harm and the purpose of an early care and education (ECE) licensing/regulatory system is to reduce the potential harm to children. In the licensing measurement literature, this 100% compliant group is generally labeled or considered the high compliant group. With some licensing laws which allow substantial but not full 100% compliance with the full set of rules, it would then be allowable to have possibly 1 or 2 violations and still be considered in this high compliant group. The low compliant group has been generally any program that had any non-compliance or had 2 or more violations. When these two groups were compared to each individual rule utilizing the phi coefficient formula it was found that a more accurate approach was to accentuate or increase the difference between the high and low groups by eliminating the intervening violations in following manner: high group of 0 violations; 1-4 violations being eliminated; 5+ violations defined as the low group. This additional bi-polarization of data helped to accentuate the differences in calculating the phi coefficient and provided a more sensitive key indicator tool.

Another data distribution issue that should be addressed here that justifies the above cutoffs is that there is very little

variance in licensing/regulatory data. Generally the frequency distribution is 20 or less and the average set of rules is over 200 rules. So the frequency distribution is extremely skewed within less than 10% of the potential data distribution. Also, the majority of programs are 100% in compliance with all the rules. And an additional complication is that the scoring of each rule is scored as if it had an equal risk value when in reality the rules can place children at either great risk to relatively little risk if found non-compliant. These measurement issues are very different than in other measurement systems such as ERS or CLASS. The important message to take from this is that rules are not a ruler, they do not measure things equally and cannot be analyzed or compared to other measurement systems that are more normally distributed.

Although licensing is part of the program quality continuum in establishing basic health and safety standards for children, it is a system with measurement limitations that can only be compared on a nominal basis making several statistical adjustments as suggested above necessary.

Enhanced Dichotomization Model for Generating Licensing Key Indicators

The licensing key indicator methodology has been evolving over the past decade in making it more sensitive to the selection process of the specific rules to be included as key indicators. Some of the enhancements can occur because of state licensing data systems being able to provide population data rather than having to select sample data. Because of the nominal nature of licensing data and the severe skewness of

the data distributions, non-parametric statistical approaches need to be employed in the analysis of the data.

A key component in the analysis of the licensing data distributions is to dichotomization of the data which is generally not warranted but is acceptable with very skewed data distributions. The dichotomization that has been most successful is a H25/M50/L25 distribution in which H25 represents the High Group of regulatory compliance, M50 which represents the Mediocre or Middle Group of regulatory compliance, L25 which represents the Lowest Group of regulatory compliance. In the past, the methodology allowed for full and substantial compliance within the High Group. This decision is no longer recommended. Rather, in order to decrease the number of False Negatives, it is now recommended that only Full (100%) regulatory compliance is used in defining the High Group. This eliminates the possibility of False Negatives.

By making this above change and in using the full distribution of licensing data, it enhances the results for generating the licensing key indicator rules. For additional information on this modeling please see: Fiene, Richard (2018), "***ECPQIM National Data Base", Mendeley Data, V1. http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/kzk6xssx4d***.1 This data base provides the detailed ECPQIM data distributions for the above changes. The enhancements increase the phi coefficients and reliability in either moving or not moving from abbreviated inspections to full comprehensive inspections. This data base also contains clear demonstrations of the efficacy of the ECPQIM – Early Childhood Program Quality Improvement and Indicator Model as a vehicle for improving early care and education programs.

The Relationship of Licensing, Head Start, Pre-K, QRIS, Accreditation, and Professional Development and their Potential Impact on Child Outcomes

This short paper will provide some thoughts about the various public policy initiatives/systems to improve early care and education, such as licensing, Head Start, Pre-K, QRIS, accreditation, and professional development and their potential impact on child outcomes. Early care and education is at a major crossroads as a profession in attempting to determine which quality initiatives have the greatest impact on children. Results are starting to come in from early studies which may provide some guidance as policy makers begin making decisions about where to focus their limited funding resources.

Improving early care and education programs has a long public policy history as we attempt to find the most cost effective and efficient means for attaining this lofty goal. There have been many ups and downs over the years where funding was adequate and when it was not, but our desire to accomplish this goal has always been front and center. Now, as a profession, we are at somewhat of a cross-roads in determining which of the many quality initiatives appear to have the greatest impact on children's development. When I refer to children's development, I am looking at the whole child from the perspective of a child's developmental status as well as the child's health and safety.

Presently we have many quality initiatives to look at which is a very good thing since at times in the past we did not always have so many choices. Probably the one constant throughout the history of early care and education in the past century has been licensing or regulations/rule formulation. Some many

argue that licensing is not a quality initiative but I would suggest that licensing has many of the structural aspects of quality that have been identified in the research literature. The other quality initiatives I will discuss have really started and been implemented in the very later part of the 20th century so we are talking about a relatively new science when we think about having its intended impact on children. Also, I am talking about large public policy initiatives rather than highly structured, single focused research studies involving small samples of children.

Let's start with licensing since this system has been present for the longest period of time. The purpose of licensing is to act as the gatekeeper to the early care and education field in which only those providers who meet specific standards, generally called rules or regulations are permitted to operate and care for children. The rules are dominated by health and safety concerns with less emphasis on curriculum planning and staff-child interactions. The rules measure more structural aspects of quality than the process aspects of quality; dealing with what attorney's call the "hard data" rather than the "soft data".

Since licensing rules allow entry into the early care and education field to provide services usually the rules are not overally stringent with the majority of providers being in high compliance if not full compliance with all the rules. This would be expected since these are basic health and safety standards. And in fact when one looks at compliance data, it is extremely skewed with the majority of providers having very high compliance scores with relatively few violations of the rules. However, this does introduce a certain difficulty in using these data for decision making purposes at an aggregate level

because so many providers score at a high level it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between the really excellent providers and the somewhat mediocre providers. Another way of looking at this skewing of the data is to term it as a plateau effect in which there is very little variance at the upper ends of the compliance spectrum. This is a major issue with skewed data and basic standards which is an important consideration with licensing but will also be an important consideration when one looks at the other quality initiatives to be addressed shortly.

Because of this plateau effect with licensing data, it may explain much of the lack of relationships found between compliance with rules and any types of outcomes related to children's outcomes and provider's overall quality. However, with licensing data and making comparisons to children's outcomes we should be looking at general health data such as immunization status and safety data such as the number of injuries at programs with varying levels of compliance with health and safety rules.

A significant development over the past two decades has been the development of national health and safety standards with the publication of Caring for Our Children (CFOC3) and Stepping Stones (SS3). Although these standards are not required but are only recommended practice that provides guidance to states as they revise their rules, these two documents have been embraced by the licensing/regulatory administration field. Although unlikely, if not impossible, to comply with all the CFOC3 standards, it would be interesting to compare states on this set of standards which may add a good deal of variance to the basic health and safety data that has been missing with licensing rules.

The next system to look at is the national Head Start program. Out of the major programs that are national in scope, Head Start has a long history of providing services to low-income children and their families. Head Start Performance Standards are definitely more stringent than licensing rules but not as stringent as accreditation standards. Based upon Head Start's more stringent standards and the additional supports that are part of its program, Head Start generally scores higher on program quality tools (e.g., CLASS or ERS) than licensed child care in states.

With Head Start programs, we at times find skewing or plateauing of data when we compare compliance with the Head Start Performance Standards (HSPS) and program quality tools such as the CLASS. However, this is dependent upon the various subscales within the CLASS in which the plateauing of data does not occur all of the time. I think that has a lot to do with the HSPS being fairly stringent standards as compared to state licensing rules in general.

A program that has gotten a good deal of support at the state level are Pre-K programs. These programs come with stricter standards than licensed child care with an emphasis on the professional development of staff. There is more concern about the process aspects of quality which focus more on teacher-child interactions. This emphasis on teacher-child interaction has paid off in which these programs generally are high performers when you compare Pre-K funded classrooms to licensed child care classrooms. In fact, Pre-K funding appears to have a positive impact on licensed child care in raising overall quality scores on the ECERS-R for all classrooms in programs that receive Pre-K funding even if some of the classrooms are not the direct beneficiaries of the

funding. This is a very significant finding because we knew that Pre-K funding increased the quality of care in classrooms receiving those funds, but now, it appears that there is a spillover effect to all classrooms co-located with Pre-K funded classrooms. I must admit that I was initially skeptical when Pre-K funding was first proposed because I thought it would take funding and the focus away from improving licensed child care at the state level; but it appears that the advocates for Pre-K were right in their assertion that Pre-K would increase the quality of all early care and education which includes licensed child care.

A more recent entry into the state funding scene are QRIS (Quality Rating and Improvement Systems) which build upon licensing systems, are voluntary, and have substantial financial incentives for participating in this quality improvement system. It is too early to really determine if QRIS is having the intended impact because the program is so new (50% of states have a QRIS), and the penetration rate is usually below 50% in any given state (remember the system is voluntary). However, in the few studies done, the results are mixed. It does appear that programs which move up the various star levels do increase the quality of care they provide; but in a most recent study looking at child outcomes, no relationship was found between increasing levels of compliance with QRIS standards and how well children did in those programs with the exception of CLASS scores in which teacher-child interactions were measured and emphasized – here there were significant relationships between higher scores on the CLASS and child outcomes.

Accreditation systems come in many varieties but there are only three that I know of in which empirical studies have been

done to validate their systems: NAEYC, NECPA for centers and NAFDC for homes. Also reliability testing has been done in each of these systems. Accreditation is a rigorous self-study that really improves programs through the self-study process. This should come as no surprise because we have known for some time that program monitoring all by itself leads to program improvements. Now when you couple that with technical assistance you see even more improvement. Accreditation is usually the other pillar of a QRIS system with licensing being the first pillar. The QRIS standards fill the gap from licensing to accreditation. Accreditation is a voluntary system just as in most cases with QRIS. However, in accreditation we are reaching less than 10% of the programs with the majority of these attaining NAEYC accreditation. NECPA and NAFDC have much smaller market shares.

The last system to be addressed is the professional development systems that have been established in all states. This is one quality improvement initiative that has 100% penetration in all states. It is usually tied to QRIS through technical assistance and mentoring (coaching). When it focuses on mentoring rather than workshops, it has demonstrated its effectiveness in changing teachers behaviors in how they interact with children in their care in a very positive fashion. This is very important because the research literature is clear about the importance of the teacher-child interaction when it comes to child outcomes. Professional development runs the gamut from pre-service (University based programs) to in-service (training, technical assistance, mentoring, coaching) programming for teachers and directors.

So where does this leave us when policy makers begin to try to determine which quality improvement initiatives should be

invested in to start with, which to increase in funding, and maybe even which ones should be defunded. I think there are some trends we need to begin to look at, such as the following:

1) Having stringent and rigorous standards is very important. The more that we do not, the more opportunities for mediocre programs to score artificially higher on whatever scale that is used. This is evident with licensing data where the data are significantly skewed with a major plateau effect at the upper end of compliance rules/regulations.

2) Emphasis on teacher-child interaction needs to be paramount in our quality improvement initiatives. Working with teachers through mentoring/coaching appears to be most effective in changing teachers' behaviors in interacting more positively with children.

3) Making sure we are measuring the right outcomes. Match health and safety standards with health and safety outcomes for children. Match developmental outcomes for children with standards that emphasize positive teacher-child interactions.

4) Building upon #1 above, find what the key indicators are with all the data that we collect. We are spending too much time in looking at too many things which in many cases are simply just not the right things to look at. As states' data systems become more sophisticated, and they are, this will be easier to do. Let's begin to utilize the data we have already collected.

Policy Commentary: Regulatory Science Measurement Issues of Skewness, Dichotomization of Data, and Nominal versus Ordinal Data Measurement

The purpose of this policy commentary is to provide some context for regulatory scientists in pursuing regulatory policy analysis, especially as it relates to regulatory compliance and human service licensing data. Regulatory scientists have dealt with non-parametric data in the past but in dealing with regulatory compliance and human service licensing data are just so different from previously measured data in that the nature of the data is nominal and extremely skewed to the point that several adjustments need to be made in order to analyze the data.

Although the examples being referred to in this policy commentary are from the human services field and discipline, I am certain that many of the basic concepts presented will pertain to other disciplines and fields of study that are impacted by regulatory science. These concepts are not unique to a particular discipline but rather are unique to regulatory science which has particular parameters, concepts, and truths which are pertinent to how regulations/rules/standards are formulated and then implemented in various jurisdictions or disciplines.

There are very logical reasons why regulatory compliance and licensing data are so extremely skewed. These data represent compliance with basic health and safety rules and regulations which provide the basic safeguards for children, youth, and adults while being cared for in a form of human services, such as child care, youth residential, or adult assisted living care.

Very honestly a state agency would not want to find their regulatory compliance data being normally distributed because this would be an indication that the facilities were in low compliance with the state's rules and regulations. Having the regulatory compliance data be highly negatively skewed is actually a good result from a public policy standpoint but not from a statistical analytical standpoint. Having 50-60% of your scores within a three-to-five-point range when there may be as many as 300-400 data points leaves very little variance in the data. It also leads to being very difficult to distinguish between the high performers and the mediocre performers. This finding has led to a theory of regulatory compliance in which substantial compliance but not full compliance with all rules and regulations is in the best interests of the clients being served (Fiene, 2019).

In the regulatory science field, this has led to public policies emphasizing substantial compliance in order to be a licensed human service facility, such as a child care center, youth residential program, or an adult assisted living center. The other aspect of regulatory compliance and licensing data for regulatory scientists to consider is that the data are nominal in measurement, either a facility is in compliance or out of compliance with a specific rule or regulation. There are no gray areas, no measurement on an ordinal scale.

There has been some discussion in the regulatory science field for the use of weighted risk assessment methodologies which could introduce more variance in the data based upon the assumption that all rules or regulations are not created equal nor are they administered equally (Stevens & Fiene, 2019). Another discussion revolves around the introduction of more program quality into the basic health and safety rules and

regulations that could extend the nominal compliance determination to an ordinal scale that goes beyond the basic compliance level (Fiene, 2018).

These measurement idiosyncrasies of regulatory compliance and licensing data are presented for regulatory scientists to consider if they begin to analyze public policies that involve basic health and safety rules and regulations which are very different from other public policies being promulgated by state and national governments. For the interested reader, an international data base for regulatory compliance and human services licensing data has been established and maintained by the Research Institute for Key Indicators and Penn State University over the past 40 years at the following URL - (http://RIKInstitute.com)

However, the hope is that other disciplines will begin to look at their data more closely to determine the natural data distributions and ascertain if they are equally as skewed as has been found in human service regulatory data. Are you measuring the data at a nominal level? Could they be measured at an ordinal level based upon a Likert scale? The data being referred to are regulatory compliance data which are pegged to specific rules/regulations/standards. It is not based upon other types of data collected within a regulatory frame of reference, such as basic demographic or descriptive data.

A Potential Reason for Skewed Regulatory Compliance Data Distributions

One thing that is ever present with regulatory compliance data distributions is that they are terribly skewed. See the previous post which provides a definition of skewed distributions and their implications. This post is going to attempt to provide a potential answer to why the data base is skewed.

At first, I was led to believe that potentially the skewness in the data was a result of the rules not being stringent enough, in other words, the health and safety standards were too easy to comply with. That could definitely be a contributing factor but this is not the case in all instances when one compares state human service rules and regulations and the Head Start Performance Standards. I think a much deeper structure may be operating that is more philosophical rather than practical.

The philosophy of regulatory compliance and rule formulation is one of risk aversion. In other words, how do we mitigate risk that potentially increases the chances of mortality or morbidity in the clients being served when a specific rule is out of compliance. This philosophy emphasizes the elimination of a risk, taking something away rather than adding to it. It is essentially, "Do No Harm". It is interesting to note that generally regulatory compliance scoring is nominal in being either "Yes" or "No"; and a lower score is better than a higher score, there are fewer violations of rules. Not the way most assessment tools are designed.

For example, when one looks at program quality, this system is based upon the open-endedness adding to rather than taking away. It is all about, "Do Good" rather than "Do No Harm". Generally when you look at the data distributions here, they

are more normally distributed without the skewed nature of regulatory compliance data distributions. Generally program quality scoring is ordinal in nature on a Likert Scale. A higher score is better than a lower score. Makes sense in that when you have more of a good thing, the higher the score. And the philosophy of program quality is one of improvement with relatively little emphasis on risk aversion.

This is an alternate explanation to why regulatory compliance data distributions are so terribly skewed in comparison to other program quality measures.

Data Distributions in Regulatory Science

Data distributions in the human services as they relate to regulatory compliance are generally very skewed distributions which means that the majority of facilities being assessed/inspected will usually fall very close to the 100% compliance level. There will also be an equally large number of facilities that are in substantial regulatory compliance (99% - 98% compliance levels). And then there are much fewer facilities that are either at a mid or low level of regulatory compliance (97% or lower compliance levels). One might say that getting a score of 97% on anything doesn't sound like it is mediocre or low but keep in mind we are addressing basic health and safety rules and not quality standards. So having several health and safety rules out of compliance is a big deal when it comes to risk assessment. It could be argued that a state licensing agency was not upholding its gatekeeper function by allowing programs to operate with such regulatory non-compliance.

Why is the regulatory compliance data distribution important from a statistical point of view. Generally when we are dealing with social science data, the data are normally distributed or pretty close to being normally distributed. It is a trade mark of a well designed assessment tool for example. So when data are compared to other normally distributed data, there is a good chance that some form of a linear relationship will be ascertained, albeit, not reaching statistical significance in many cases but linear regardless.

When a very skewed data distribution is one of the variables as in the case with regulatory compliance data and it is compared with a normally distributed data set such as a program quality tool, ERS or CLASS. Well, the result is generally a non-linear relationship with a marked ceiling effect or plateau effect. In other words, the data distribution is more curvilinear than linear. From a practical standpoint this creates selection problems in the inability to identify the best programs that have full regulatory compliance. This can create a public policy nightmare in that those programs which are in substantial but not full regulatory compliance are as good or in some cases of higher quality than those programs in full regulatory compliance. The interesting question is does the combination of normally distributed data distributions with variables that have skewed data distributions always produce this nonlinear result?!

And lastly, will having two variables that are skewed data distributions produce a more random result than if one of the two above conditions are present?

The Ten Principles of Regulatory Compliance Measurement

The first principle deals with the lack of Variance in data distributions. Data are found to be tightly grouped at high compliance levels (upper 90% level). This will lead to another principle addressed later in this paper dealing with skewness of the data distribution. In fact, the majority of scores are at a full regulatory compliance level, in other words, 100% in compliance with all rules and regulations. This led to variance statistics showing little movement and the majority of programs being in very close proximity. This makes for difficult statistical analyses when there is little variance in the data set.

The second principle is finding a ceiling or plateau effect in data distributions. It was like there was a diminishing returns effect as one moves from substantial regulatory compliance (upper 90%+) to full regulatory compliance (100%) with all rules and regulations. This was especially true when one compares the regulatory compliance levels with program quality scores on those same programs which is addressed more in the next principle.

The third principle is the difficulty distinguishing levels of quality between full and substantial compliance. This principle builds off of the previous principle dealing with a ceiling or plateau effect. Because so much of the data, as much as 70-80% of programs, are grouped so tightly at the substantial and high levels of regulatory compliance when one begins to go beyond regulatory compliance and begin to look at quality there is a great deal of difficulty distinguishing

levels of quality. In other words, the full regulatory compliant level programs are not necessarily the highest quality programs.

The fourth principle is the fact that rules and regulations are measured at a nominal measurement level: the rules and regulations are either In-Compliance or Out-of-Compliance. The rule or regulation is measured at a "Yes" or "No" level or a "1" or "0" level. There are no in-between measures, no ordinal measurement going on. Either you got it, or you don't. It is black or white, no shades of gray. It is just the nature of measurement when it comes to rules and regulations which are very different in other measurement systems. The data are very discrete and not continuous. They are frequency counts and not a ruler type of measurement. One will not find an interval level of measurement in any regulatory science data distribution.

A fifth principle is attempting to move to an ordinal measurement level when quality is included. This principle builds off of the previous principle in which in some cases it has been suggested to add a quality component to particular rules or regulations. This is an interesting development and moves the philosophy from one of "Do no harm" to one of "Do things well". It will be interesting to see how much this concept moves forward and changes a basic tenet in the regulatory science field which is more based upon health & safety, gatekeeper, hard data, risk aversion, and deficit based.

The sixth principle of regulatory compliance measurement is the ability to dichotomize the data can be warranted because of the data distribution. Data dichotomization is generally not recommended because it accentuates differences in a data set.

However, given the nature of regulatory compliance measurement being at a nominal level, fitting into a bucket format, the lack of variance, and the skewness of the data distribution all lead to the ability to dichotomization of the data set.

The seventh principle has to do with the problem with false negatives and positives, especially false negatives. Because of the data being measured in a nominal In-Compliance vs Out-of-Compliance dichotomy it can lead to false negatives in which In-Compliance decisions are made that in reality are not In-Compliance. False positives are a problem as well but not as much of a problem as false negatives. In false positives, Out-of-Compliance may be determined when in reality the rule or regulation is actually In-Compliance. This is not a good scenario for the provider of services, but it potentially doesn't harm the client as much as when a false negative occurs.

The eighth principle is the lack of reliability and validity testing. This principle builds from the previous principle in that there are very few examples of scientific testing of instrumentation and the administration of protocols to make certain that everything is running as it should. Because of this, it leads to the above problem of false positives and negatives. All jurisdictions need to build in regular reliability and validity testing to ascertain that the final decision making is within the ranges that are acceptable.

The ninth principle is the ease in distinguishing levels of quality between low and substantial compliance. The one result that has been consistent over the years is the ability to see differences in programs that score low on regulatory

compliance versus those that are at a substantial or high compliant level. From a licensing or regulatory administration point of view this is a real plus in being able to be an effective gatekeeper and keeping non-optimal programs out of service. But as indicated in the third principle this advantage is short-lived as one moves up the regulatory compliance scale to substantial and finally to full regulatory compliance. When one gets to these levels it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish differences in quality in those programs that are in substantial regulatory compliance versus those that are in full regulatory compliance. It appears that the regulatory compliance theory of diminishing returns is rearing its plateau/ceiling effect. The policy implications are immense since the assumption is that there is a linear relationship between program quality and regulatory compliance. How do we more effectively deal with this non-linear relationship in formulating public policy regarding licensing decision making?

And the final tenth principle is that regulatory compliance data are always skewed data. The majority of programs are in substantial or full regulatory compliance. And in many cases, this can be rather severe. There generally is a long tail which contains some low regulatory compliant programs, but these are usually few in number. The data distribution just does not approach a normally distributed curve as we see in many other examples of social science data distributions.

It is important as the regulatory science field moves forward that we remain cognizant of the limitations of regulatory compliance measurement. There are some severe limitations that need to be addressed (e.g., skewed data, lack of variance in data, ceiling effect, nominal metrics) and building in

mitigation strategies (e.g., data dichotomization) or it will continue to lead to problems in our analyses (e.g., false positives and negatives).

Licensing Measurement, Regulatory Compliance and Monitoring Systems: Regulatory Science Applied to Human Services Regulatory Administration Summary

In the realm of human services regulatory administration, ensuring compliance with licensing requirements is crucial for maintaining quality standards and safeguarding the well-being of individuals receiving care. As regulatory agencies strive to enhance their oversight and monitoring capabilities, the integration of measurement and monitoring systems has emerged as a valuable tool.

This paper explores the significance of licensing measurement, regulatory compliance, and monitoring systems and delves into the application of regulatory science in the context of human services regulatory administration. It will deal with several issues related to this topic and expand its content beyond early care and education which has been more of the focus previously.

Licensing measurement and monitoring systems play a crucial role in regulatory administration for several reasons:

Compliance Verification: Regulatory agencies need to ensure that businesses and individuals comply with specific laws, regulations, and standards. Licensing measurement and

monitoring systems provide a means to verify compliance by collecting data and measuring various parameters. These systems help regulators determine whether license holders are meeting the required standards and taking appropriate actions to mitigate risks.

Quality Assurance: Licensing measurement and monitoring systems contribute to quality assurance efforts by assessing the performance of licensed entities. They enable regulators to monitor the quality of services and activities associated with the licensing process. By establishing measurement criteria and tracking the relevant metrics, regulators can ensure that license holders maintain the desired level of quality and meet the expectations of consumers or the public.

Risk Management: Many industries involve inherent risks that need to be managed effectively. Licensing measurement and monitoring systems allow regulatory agencies to assess and monitor the risks associated with licensed activities. By continuously monitoring key indicators, regulators can identify potential risks, deviations from safety standards, or non-compliance issues. This information helps regulators take appropriate actions to minimize risks and ensure public safety.

Data-Driven Decision Making: Licensing measurement and monitoring systems generate substantial amounts of data that can be analyzed to make informed decisions. Regulators can analyze trends, patterns, and performance metrics to identify areas of concern or improvement. Data-driven insights enable regulators to make evidence-based decisions, allocate resources effectively, and prioritize enforcement actions where they are most needed.

Enforcement and Remediation: When non-compliance or deviations from regulations are identified, licensing measurement and monitoring systems provide evidence to support enforcement actions. Regulators can use the data collected to take appropriate enforcement measures, such as issuing warnings, imposing penalties, or revoking licenses. These systems also help in tracking the progress of remedial actions taken by license holders to address any identified issues or deficiencies.

Transparency and Accountability: Licensing measurement and monitoring systems enhance transparency and accountability in regulatory administration. By implementing these systems, regulators can demonstrate their commitment to fair and consistent enforcement of regulations. The data collected and analyzed can be made accessible to the public, stakeholders, and policymakers, fostering trust, and allowing for external scrutiny of regulatory processes.

Licensing measurement and monitoring systems are vital in regulatory administration as they facilitate compliance verification, quality assurance, risk management, data-driven decision making, enforcement, and accountability. These systems help regulators ensure that licensed entities operate within the set standards, mitigate risks effectively, and safeguard the interests of the public.

Regulatory Science is relevant to human services regulatory administration in all industries. Regulatory science is the scientific discipline that combines various fields, including law, public policy, data analysis, and risk assessment, to

inform and guide regulatory decision-making. Measurement and monitoring systems are regulatory science aids in the development and implementation of evidence-based regulations and policies.

Regulatory agencies overseeing a wide range of human services, such as healthcare facilities, child care centers, mental health institutions, and more, face several challenges in their oversight role. Some of the key challenges include:

Diverse and Complex Landscape: The human services sector encompasses a broad range of industries, each with its unique complexities, regulations, and standards. Regulatory agencies must navigate and understand this diverse landscape to effectively oversee and enforce compliance. The sheer variety of services, settings, and stakeholders involved makes it challenging to develop uniform regulations and monitoring approaches that address the specific needs of each sector.

Rapidly Evolving Practices and Technologies: The human services field is constantly evolving, with new practices, technologies, and treatments emerging. Regulatory agencies need to keep pace with these changes to ensure that the regulations remain relevant and up-to-date. However, this can be a challenging task, as it requires continuous monitoring, research, and adaptation of regulations to address emerging risks and advancements adequately.

Resource Constraints: Regulatory agencies often face resource constraints in terms of staffing, funding, and technological capabilities. Insufficient resources can limit their capacity to conduct thorough inspections, investigations, and monitoring

activities. Additionally, limited resources may also impact the frequency and intensity of oversight, making it difficult to identify and address compliance issues effectively.

Compliance Variability: Human services facilities and institutions can vary significantly in terms of size, ownership, resources, and compliance history. Regulatory agencies need to develop oversight strategies that account for these variations while ensuring consistent enforcement and quality standards across the board. Balancing the need for flexibility with the need for uniformity is a constant challenge for regulatory agencies. And this becomes increasingly complex when dealing with the regulatory compliance theory of diminishing returns/ceiling effect.

Stakeholder Engagement and Resistance: Regulatory oversight often involves engaging with various stakeholders, including facility owners, professionals, service recipients, advocacy groups, and the public. These stakeholders may have different interests, priorities, and perspectives, leading to potential conflicts or resistance to regulatory measures. Balancing the diverse viewpoints and managing stakeholder expectations is essential for effective oversight.

Data Management and Analysis: The vast amount of data generated by human services facilities can pose challenges in terms of data management, analysis, and interpretation. Regulatory agencies need robust systems and processes to collect, store, analyze, and make sense of the data to identify trends, patterns, and areas of concern. The integration and interoperability of data systems across different sectors and agencies can be complex and time-consuming.

Legal and Ethical Considerations: Regulatory agencies must operate within legal frameworks and adhere to ethical standards while overseeing human services. They need to strike a balance between protecting public health and safety and respecting individual rights and privacy. Navigating legal complexities, ensuring due process, and maintaining confidentiality can be challenging in an environment where ethical dilemmas may arise.

Addressing these challenges requires a proactive and adaptive approach from regulatory agencies. They need to foster collaboration with stakeholders, invest in capacity-building efforts, leverage technology for efficient data management, and engage in continuous evaluation and improvement of their oversight strategies.

Inadequate monitoring in the human services can have significant risks and consequences, highlighting the need for robust systems that ensure compliance and promote accountability. Human services encompass a wide range of sectors, including healthcare, social welfare, child protection, and criminal justice. Monitoring in these areas is essential to safeguard the well-being and rights of individuals, prevent abuses, and ensure the effective delivery of services. Here are some potential risks and consequences of inadequate monitoring:

Abuse and neglect: Without proper monitoring, vulnerable individuals may be at a higher risk of abuse, neglect, or exploitation. For instance, in healthcare settings, inadequate monitoring can lead to medical errors, mistreatment of

patients, or substandard care. Similarly, in child protection services, insufficient monitoring can result in children remaining in abusive or neglectful environments.

Violation of rights: Inadequate monitoring can lead to violations of individuals' rights, including their civil liberties, privacy, and dignity. For example, in criminal justice systems, inadequate monitoring can result in wrongful convictions, excessive use of force, or violations of prisoners' rights. In social welfare programs, lack of monitoring can lead to discrimination, improper denial of benefits, or infringement of recipients' rights.

Inefficiency and ineffective service delivery: Monitoring is crucial for evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of human services. Without robust monitoring systems, it becomes challenging to identify gaps, assess performance, and make informed decisions for improvement. Inadequate monitoring may lead to wastage of resources, duplication of efforts, or the continuation of ineffective programs that fail to meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries. This is where risk assessment rules and key indicator rules play an important role in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the monitoring process by utilizing a more differential monitoring approach.

Lack of accountability: Monitoring plays a vital role in ensuring accountability within human service systems. It helps identify and address instances of misconduct, malpractice, or non-compliance with regulations and standards. Inadequate monitoring can result in a lack of transparency and accountability, allowing misconduct to go unnoticed,

perpetrators to go unpunished, and systemic problems to persist.

Loss of public trust: Inadequate monitoring erodes public trust in human service systems. When people perceive that their well-being, rights, or safety are compromised due to poor monitoring, it undermines their confidence in these services. Public trust is crucial for the effective functioning of human services, as it promotes cooperation, engagement, and participation of individuals and communities.

To mitigate these risks and consequences, robust monitoring systems are essential. Such systems should include clear guidelines, regular inspections, audits, reporting mechanisms, and independent oversight bodies. They should also leverage technology and data analysis to enhance monitoring capabilities and identify patterns or anomalies. Additionally, staff training on monitoring protocols and the establishment of a culture of accountability are crucial components of an effective monitoring framework.

Inadequate monitoring in human services poses significant risks and consequences. It can lead to abuse, neglect, rights violations, inefficiencies, lack of accountability, and loss of public trust. Robust monitoring systems, incorporating clear guidelines, regular inspections, technology, and independent oversight, are necessary to ensure compliance, protect individuals, and promote accountability within human service sectors.

The integration of measurement and monitoring systems into the licensing process in human services is a crucial

development that leverages technology and data analytics to track, evaluate, and verify compliance with licensing standards. These systems provide real-time monitoring capabilities, enabling early detection of non-compliance, improved transparency, and enhanced accountability. Let's delve into the details of how these systems work and the benefits they bring.

Measurement and monitoring systems in the context of human services licensing involve the use of advanced technologies, such as sensors, cameras, electronic record-keeping systems, and data analytics tools. These technologies are integrated into the licensing process to collect, analyze, and interpret relevant data in real-time. The aim is to ensure that organizations and individuals providing human services comply with the established licensing standards and regulations.

One significant advantage of integrating measurement and monitoring systems is the early detection of non-compliance. With real-time monitoring, regulatory agencies can identify potential violations promptly. For example, if a human services facility is required to maintain a specific temperature range, sensors can continuously monitor the temperature levels. If there is a deviation from the acceptable range, an alert can be triggered, enabling swift corrective action. This early detection mechanism helps prevent potential risks and harm to individuals receiving those services.

Moreover, these systems improve transparency by providing accurate and objective data. Instead of relying solely on periodic inspections or self-reported information, regulatory agencies can access real-time data collected by the monitoring

systems. This data-driven approach ensures a more comprehensive and accurate assessment of compliance with licensing standards. It reduces the reliance on subjective observations and minimizes the possibility of information gaps or bias.

Furthermore, integrating measurement and monitoring systems enhances accountability for organizations and individuals providing human services. By continuously monitoring and recording data, these systems create an audit trail that can be used for accountability purposes. The collected data provides evidence of compliance or non-compliance with licensing standards, which can be used in regulatory investigations or legal proceedings if necessary. This level of accountability fosters a culture of responsibility and incentivizes compliance with licensing requirements.

The benefits of these systems extend beyond regulatory agencies. Service providers themselves can benefit from real-time monitoring by gaining insights into their own operations and performance. By analyzing the data collected, they can identify areas for improvement, optimize resource allocation, and make evidence-based decisions to enhance the quality of their services. This data-driven approach supports continuous improvement and helps providers meet and exceed licensing standards.

The integration of measurement and monitoring systems into the licensing process in human services offers significant advantages. It leverages technology and data analytics to enable real-time monitoring, early detection of non-compliance, improved transparency, and enhanced

accountability. These systems provide regulatory agencies with objective data to ensure compliance with licensing standards and promote the safety and well-being of individuals receiving human services. Simultaneously, service providers benefit from insights gained through data analysis, allowing them to optimize their operations and deliver higher quality services.

Licensing measurement and monitoring systems in human services play a crucial role in ensuring compliance with regulations, tracking licensing activities, and monitoring the quality and safety of services provided. These systems typically consist of several key components that work together to enable effective measurement and monitoring. Here are the main components:

Comprehensive Databases: A central database is essential for storing all licensing-related information, including provider details, facility data, licensing standards, inspection reports, and compliance history. These databases provide a foundation for data collection, analysis, and reporting.

Example: The Child Care Licensing System (CCLS) developed by the Administration for Children and Families in the United States is a comprehensive database that tracks and manages child care licensing information. It allows agencies to manage licensing processes, track violations, and generate reports.

Automated Data Collection Tools: Automation tools streamline the process of data collection by capturing information electronically, reducing manual effort, and

improving accuracy. These tools can include online application forms, electronic submission of documentation, and automated notifications.

Example: The Integrated Regulatory Information System (IRIS) used by the California Department of Social Services enables online application submissions, digital document management, and automated notifications for licensing updates. It simplifies the data collection process and enhances efficiency.

Risk Assessment Algorithms: Risk assessment algorithms help identify high-risk facilities or providers that require increased monitoring or intervention. These algorithms analyze various factors such as compliance history, complaint data, inspection results, and other relevant indicators to prioritize resources effectively.

Example: The Risk Assessment and Management Tool (RAM) implemented by the Australian Government's Department of Health is used to assess and manage risks associated with aged care services. RAM employs algorithms that analyze data on quality indicators, complaints, and non-compliance to determine risk levels and allocate resources accordingly.

Data Visualization Platforms: Data visualization platforms present licensing data in a user-friendly and meaningful way, allowing regulatory agencies to monitor trends, identify patterns, and make data-driven decisions. These platforms often include interactive dashboards, charts, and reports.

Example: The Licensing Information System (LIS) developed by the Department of Health and Human Services in the state of Maine provides a data visualization platform that allows users to generate customized reports, view interactive charts, and track licensing compliance trends.

Compliance Monitoring Tools: Compliance monitoring tools assist in conducting inspections, audits, and other monitoring activities efficiently. These tools can include mobile applications for inspectors to collect data on-site, electronic checklists, and automated scheduling of inspections.

Example: The Licensing Automation System (LAS) implemented by the Minnesota Department of Human Services offers mobile applications for licensing staff to perform inspections, record findings, and generate inspection reports on the go. It simplifies the monitoring process and improves accuracy.

Overall, these components work together to create effective licensing measurement and monitoring systems in human services. By leveraging comprehensive databases, automated data collection tools, risk assessment algorithms, data visualization platforms, and compliance monitoring tools, regulatory agencies can enhance their oversight capabilities, improve efficiency, and ensure the provision of high-quality services while maintaining compliance with regulations.

Licensing measurement and monitoring systems have had a significant impact on regulatory administration and the human services sector. These systems play a crucial role in enabling regulators to proactively identify potential risks, address

compliance issues promptly, and ensure the safety and quality of services provided. In this response, we will discuss the impact of these systems and provide case studies and examples that illustrate the positive outcomes achieved through their implementation.

One of the primary benefits of licensing measurement and monitoring systems is their ability to provide regulators with real-time data and insights. These systems collect and analyze various metrics and indicators, allowing regulators to monitor the performance and compliance of service providers. By having access to accurate and up-to-date information, regulators can proactively identify potential risks and address them before they escalate into serious problems.

For instance, let's consider the case of a regulatory agency responsible for overseeing childcare facilities. By implementing a licensing measurement and monitoring system, the agency can track key indicators such as staff-to-child ratios, health and safety inspections, and educational programs. If the system detects any deviations from the established standards, it can alert regulators, enabling them to intervene promptly. This proactive approach helps prevent incidents and ensures that children receive appropriate care and support.

Another positive outcome of licensing measurement and monitoring systems is improved compliance management. These systems streamline the process of monitoring and assessing compliance with regulations and standards. Service providers can input data directly into the system, reducing the administrative burden and ensuring accuracy. Regulators can

then use this data to identify patterns, assess compliance levels, and take appropriate actions if non-compliance is detected.

For example, let's consider the case of a regulatory agency overseeing healthcare facilities. With a licensing measurement and monitoring system in place, the agency can track indicators such as medication errors, infection rates, and patient satisfaction scores. If the system identifies a healthcare facility with consistently high medication error rates, regulators can conduct targeted inspections and work closely with the facility to implement corrective measures. This proactive approach not only improves patient safety but also helps service providers enhance the quality of care they deliver.

Furthermore, licensing measurement and monitoring systems contribute to transparency and accountability in the human services sector. These systems provide a centralized platform where regulators, service providers, and the public can access information about licensing status, compliance records, and performance metrics. By promoting transparency, these systems help build trust among stakeholders and empower individuals to make informed decisions about service providers.

For instance, in the context of elder care services, a licensing measurement and monitoring system can provide a public database that includes information on the licensing status of assisted living facilities, compliance records related to safety standards, and ratings based on resident satisfaction surveys. This enables families and individuals seeking care for their

loved ones to make informed choices and select facilities that meet their specific needs.

Licensing measurement and monitoring systems have had a transformative impact on regulatory administration and the human services sector. These systems enable regulators to proactively identify potential risks, address compliance issues promptly, and ensure the safety and quality of services provided. Through case studies and examples, we have seen how these systems have improved oversight in childcare, healthcare, and elder care, leading to positive outcomes such as enhanced safety, improved compliance, and increased transparency. The implementation of such systems has the potential to further strengthen regulatory efforts and promote the well-being of individuals receiving human services.

Licensing measurement and monitoring systems can present various challenges and considerations, including privacy concerns, data security, resource constraints, and the need for ongoing system updates and maintenance. Addressing these challenges is crucial to ensure the effective implementation and operation of these systems. Additionally, collaboration between regulatory agencies, stakeholders, and technology providers is essential to overcome these challenges and maximize the benefits of these systems.

Privacy concerns: Measurement and monitoring systems often involve the collection and analysis of sensitive data, such as personal information or proprietary business data. It is important to establish robust privacy policies and legal frameworks to protect individuals' privacy rights and ensure compliance with relevant data protection regulations.

Implementing anonymization techniques, data minimization principles, and obtaining appropriate consent can help mitigate privacy concerns.

Data security: The storage, transmission, and analysis of measurement and monitoring data require robust security measures to prevent unauthorized access, data breaches, or cyber-attacks. Encryption, access controls, regular security audits, and adherence to industry best practices can help safeguard the data and maintain its integrity and confidentiality.

Resource constraints: Licensing measurement and monitoring systems can pose financial and logistical challenges, particularly for smaller organizations or developing countries with limited resources. These systems may require substantial investments in infrastructure, equipment, and skilled personnel. Adequate funding mechanisms, public-private partnerships, and capacity-building initiatives can help address resource constraints and ensure broader access to these systems.

Ongoing system updates and maintenance: Measurement and monitoring systems must be regularly updated to keep pace with evolving technologies, regulatory requirements, and scientific advancements. This necessitates ongoing maintenance, software updates, calibration, and quality control procedures. Collaboration between regulatory agencies, technology providers, and stakeholders is crucial to establish effective mechanisms for system maintenance, ensuring that the systems remain accurate, reliable, and up-to-date.

Collaboration between regulatory agencies, stakeholders, and technology providers: Overcoming the challenges associated with licensing measurement and monitoring systems requires a collaborative approach. Regulatory agencies should engage in constructive dialogues with stakeholders, including industry representatives, environmental organizations, and community groups. Collaboration can help address concerns, establish common standards, and promote transparency and accountability. Technology providers can contribute by developing user-friendly and interoperable systems that meet regulatory requirements while minimizing the burden on end-users.

Collaboration among regulatory agencies, stakeholders, and technology providers is critical to ensure the successful implementation of measurement and monitoring systems. By working together, these entities can develop robust policies, address privacy concerns, enhance data security, allocate necessary resources, and establish mechanisms for ongoing system updates and maintenance. This collaborative approach will maximize the effectiveness of these systems in monitoring and safeguarding various aspects of public health, environmental quality, and regulatory compliance.

Licensing measurement and monitoring systems play a crucial role in human services regulatory administration by ensuring compliance, enhancing service quality, and protecting individuals receiving care. Integrating regulatory science principles into licensing processes further strengthens these benefits.

One significant aspect of licensing measurement and monitoring systems is their ability to promote compliance. These systems provide a standardized framework for evaluating and assessing the compliance of service providers with established regulations and standards. By implementing these systems, regulatory authorities can systematically track and measure compliance levels, identify areas of non-compliance, and take appropriate actions to rectify any deficiencies. This helps maintain a high level of accountability among service providers, ensuring they adhere to the required standards and regulations.

Moreover, integrating regulatory science principles into licensing processes brings several advantages. Regulatory science applies scientific knowledge and methodologies to inform regulatory decision-making. By incorporating these principles into licensing, regulators can leverage evidence-based approaches to establish standards, design measurement tools, and set performance benchmarks. This approach promotes objectivity, transparency, and consistency in the licensing process, ensuring that decisions are based on sound scientific evidence rather than subjective judgment.

Another key benefit is the potential for improved service quality. Licensing measurement and monitoring systems enable regulators to gather comprehensive data on service providers' performance, outcomes, and service quality indicators. This information allows for a thorough assessment of service delivery, identifying strengths and weaknesses in the system. By analyzing this data, regulators can provide feedback, guidance, and support to service providers, fostering continuous improvement in service quality. This leads to better

outcomes for individuals receiving care and enhances overall service provision within the human services sector.

Furthermore, licensing measurement and monitoring systems are instrumental in protecting the well-being of individuals receiving care. These systems help identify potential risks, such as violations of safety protocols or instances of abuse or neglect. By closely monitoring service providers, regulators can swiftly respond to any issues, take necessary corrective actions, and ensure the safety and well-being of vulnerable populations. Regular monitoring also acts as a deterrent, encouraging service providers to maintain high standards and comply with regulations to avoid penalties or sanctions.

Looking ahead, the field of regulatory science and measurement and monitoring systems is continually evolving. Advances in technology, data analytics, and artificial intelligence present opportunities for further advancements in these systems. For example, the integration of real-time data collection and analysis can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of monitoring processes. Predictive analytics and risk assessment models can help regulators proactively identify potential areas of concern and allocate resources accordingly. Additionally, the incorporation of feedback from individuals receiving care and other stakeholders can further refine measurement systems, ensuring they capture the most relevant and meaningful indicators of service quality.

In conclusion, licensing measurement and monitoring systems are vital components of human services regulatory administration. By integrating regulatory science principles, these systems promote compliance, improve service quality,

and protect individuals receiving care. As regulatory science continues to evolve, the potential for further advancements in measurement and monitoring systems is promising, enabling regulators to better fulfill their mandate of safeguarding the well-being of vulnerable populations.

Importance of the Theory of Regulatory Compliance

Regulatory compliance refers to the process by which individuals, organizations, or entities adhere to and fulfill the requirements set forth by relevant laws, regulations, and industry standards. It involves ensuring that policies, procedures, and practices align with the specific legal and regulatory frameworks applicable to a particular industry or jurisdiction.

Compliance involves actively identifying and understanding the relevant regulations, establishing internal controls and processes to meet those requirements, and consistently monitoring and reviewing operations to ensure ongoing adherence. It encompasses various aspects, such as legal, financial, operational, and ethical considerations, and aims to ensure that organizations operate within the boundaries of the law, maintain ethical standards, and fulfill their responsibilities to stakeholders, customers, and the public.

The theory of regulatory compliance provides a framework for understanding the underlying principles and concepts that guide the compliance process. It encompasses several key elements that shape the approach to achieving and maintaining compliance. Here is an overview of the theory of regulatory compliance:

Legal and Regulatory Environment: The theory recognizes that regulatory compliance is rooted in the legal and regulatory landscape. It acknowledges the importance of identifying and understanding applicable laws, regulations, and standards that govern an industry or jurisdiction.

Risk Management: The theory emphasizes the proactive identification, assessment, and management of risks associated with non-compliance. It highlights the need to establish robust risk management processes to mitigate legal, financial, operational, and reputational risks.

Policies and Procedures: Effective compliance requires the development and implementation of comprehensive policies and procedures. The theory underscores the significance of clear, well-documented, and communicated policies that guide employees in adhering to regulatory requirements.

Internal Controls: The theory emphasizes the establishment of internal controls to ensure compliance. This involves designing and implementing systems, processes, and checks that monitor and mitigate risks, detect and prevent non-compliance, and promote accountability.

Training and Awareness: Recognizing the role of individuals in compliance, the theory highlights the importance of training programs and awareness initiatives. It emphasizes educating employees about applicable regulations, ethical standards, and the organization's compliance obligations.

Monitoring and Auditing: The theory acknowledges the need for ongoing monitoring and auditing to assess compliance effectiveness. Regular internal audits, reviews, and assessments help identify gaps, weaknesses, and areas for improvement, ensuring continuous compliance efforts.

Reporting and Documentation: The theory stresses the significance of accurate and timely reporting of compliance activities. It underscores the need to maintain proper documentation, records, and evidence of compliance processes, actions taken, and outcomes achieved.

Compliance Culture: The theory recognizes that compliance is not solely a set of rules and processes but also a cultural mindset. It highlights the importance of fostering a culture of compliance within an organization, where integrity, ethics, and adherence to regulations are valued and embedded in the organizational DNA.

Accountability and Enforcement: The theory acknowledges that compliance requires accountability for non-compliance. It recognizes the role of regulatory bodies, internal enforcement mechanisms, and disciplinary actions in promoting compliance and deterring violations.

Continuous Improvement: Finally, the theory emphasizes the need for continuous improvement in compliance efforts. It encourages organizations to learn from past experiences, adapt to evolving regulations, embrace emerging best practices, and strive for excellence in their compliance initiatives.

By understanding and applying the theory of regulatory compliance, organizations can establish a solid foundation for effective compliance management, minimize risks, and uphold legal and ethical standards in their operations.

Ensuring Legal and Ethical Practices

Compliance with laws and regulations is a fundamental aspect of the theory of regulatory compliance. It recognizes that adherence to legal and regulatory requirements is crucial for organizations to operate within the boundaries set by governing bodies and to fulfill their obligations to stakeholders. Here are key points related to compliance with laws and regulations in the context of the theory of regulatory compliance:

Understanding Applicable Laws: The theory emphasizes the importance of identifying and comprehending the specific laws and regulations that pertain to an organization's industry, jurisdiction, and operational activities. This involves staying updated with changes in regulations and interpreting their implications for the organization.

Regulatory Research and Analysis: Organizations need to conduct thorough research and analysis to determine how laws and regulations apply to their operations. This includes examining regulatory frameworks, guidance documents, legal precedents, and industry-specific requirements.

Compliance Obligations: The theory recognizes that compliance obligations vary based on the nature of the organization's activities. It stresses the need to determine the

specific requirements, obligations, and standards that the organization must meet to ensure legal and regulatory compliance.

Compliance Program Development: To achieve compliance, the theory highlights the importance of developing a comprehensive compliance program tailored to the organization's needs. This involves establishing policies, procedures, and controls that align with legal and regulatory requirements.

Regulatory Reporting and Filings: Compliance entails fulfilling reporting obligations to regulatory authorities. The theory emphasizes the significance of timely and accurate reporting, including financial statements, disclosures, permits, licenses, certifications, and other regulatory filings.

Compliance Monitoring and Auditing: The theory underscores the need for ongoing monitoring and auditing of compliance efforts. Regular reviews help identify potential compliance gaps, assess the effectiveness of controls, and ensure corrective actions are taken to address non-compliance.

Compliance Documentation: Documentation plays a critical role in compliance. The theory highlights the importance of maintaining accurate and comprehensive records of compliance activities, including policies, procedures, training materials, audit reports, incident reports, and evidence of compliance.

Compliance Risk Assessment: Organizations should conduct compliance risk assessments to identify and evaluate potential

risks associated with non-compliance. This allows for the implementation of risk mitigation strategies, such as internal controls, training programs, and monitoring systems.

Enforcement and Consequences: The theory acknowledges that non-compliance can lead to legal and financial consequences. It emphasizes the need for organizations to understand the potential penalties, fines, sanctions, and reputational damage that can result from violations of laws and regulations.

Regulatory Engagement and Communication: Organizations should actively engage with regulatory authorities and maintain open lines of communication. The theory emphasizes the importance of understanding regulatory expectations, seeking guidance when needed, and participating in industry consultations.

By emphasizing compliance with laws and regulations, the theory of regulatory compliance aims to ensure that organizations operate within legal boundaries, mitigate risks, protect stakeholders, and maintain a strong ethical foundation in their operations.

Protection of Consumers and Public Interest

Protection of consumers and the public interest is a fundamental objective of regulatory compliance. Regulatory compliance refers to the adherence of individuals, organizations, or businesses to laws, regulations, and guidelines set forth by governing bodies or regulatory authorities. It aims to ensure that entities operate in a manner

that safeguards the interests of consumers and the general public.

The theory behind regulatory compliance is rooted in the belief that certain industries or activities require oversight and regulation to prevent harm, ensure fair competition, and maintain public trust. By establishing rules and standards, regulatory bodies seek to create a level playing field, promote transparency, and protect the well-being of consumers.

Key principles and considerations associated with regulatory compliance for the protection of consumers and public interest include:

Consumer Protection: Regulatory compliance frameworks typically include provisions to safeguard consumers from fraudulent, deceptive, or unfair practices. This involves regulations related to product safety, labeling, advertising, pricing, warranties, and consumer rights.

Public Health and Safety: Compliance regulations often address public health and safety concerns. For instance, in the pharmaceutical industry, compliance with drug safety regulations ensures that medications meet quality standards and do not pose unreasonable risks to patients.

Market Integrity: Regulatory compliance helps maintain the integrity of markets by prohibiting anti-competitive behavior, ensuring fair trading practices, and preventing market manipulation or insider trading. These regulations promote fair competition and protect consumers from monopolistic practices.

Data Protection and Privacy: With the increasing prevalence of data-driven technologies, regulatory compliance frameworks emphasize the protection of personal information and privacy rights. Regulations like the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) aim to safeguard consumer data and establish guidelines for its lawful collection, storage, and use.

Financial Stability: Regulatory compliance plays a crucial role in the financial sector to prevent fraud, money laundering, and unethical practices that can destabilize markets or harm consumers. Regulations impose standards for capital adequacy, risk management, disclosure, and consumer financial protection.

Ethical Considerations: Compliance regulations often incorporate ethical considerations to ensure responsible and ethical behavior by individuals and organizations. This may involve guidelines on corporate governance, social responsibility, environmental sustainability, or labor practices.

To ensure effective regulatory compliance, regulatory bodies conduct inspections, audits, and enforcement actions. Non-compliance can result in penalties, fines, or legal actions against the offending parties. Moreover, compliance management systems, internal controls, and self-regulatory mechanisms are employed by organizations to proactively adhere to regulatory requirements and promote a culture of compliance.

Overall, the theory of regulatory compliance revolves around the idea that by setting and enforcing rules, regulators can protect consumers, preserve public interest, and maintain the stability and fairness of various sectors in society.

Financial Stability and Risk Management

Financial stability and risk management are critical components of regulatory compliance. The theory of regulatory compliance emphasizes the importance of establishing and enforcing regulations to ensure the stability and integrity of financial systems, protect consumers, and mitigate systemic risks.

Here are some key aspects of the theory of regulatory compliance related to financial stability and risk management:

Prudential Regulation: Prudential regulation focuses on ensuring the soundness and stability of financial institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, and investment firms. Regulatory compliance frameworks impose requirements related to capital adequacy, risk management, liquidity, and asset quality to prevent excessive risk-taking and protect the financial system from disruptions.

Systemic Risk Mitigation: Regulatory compliance measures aim to identify and mitigate systemic risks that can have widespread adverse effects on the financial system. This includes regulations on risk concentration, interconnectedness, and exposure limits to prevent the domino effect of failures and contagion across institutions.

Risk Assessment and Monitoring: Regulatory compliance frameworks often require financial institutions to conduct thorough risk assessments and implement robust risk management practices. This involves identifying, measuring, and monitoring various types of risks, including credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk. Compliance regulations may prescribe specific methodologies, reporting requirements, and stress testing to ensure that risks are adequately identified and managed.

Transparency and Disclosure: Regulatory compliance promotes transparency in financial markets by requiring financial institutions to provide accurate and timely disclosure of relevant information to investors, regulators, and the public. This includes financial reporting, disclosures of risk exposures, and information about the institution's financial health. Transparent reporting helps stakeholders make informed decisions, enhances market efficiency, and fosters trust in the financial system.

Consumer Financial Protection: Regulatory compliance frameworks incorporate measures to protect consumers in financial transactions. This includes regulations on fair lending practices, disclosure requirements for financial products and services, and regulations against abusive or predatory practices. These regulations aim to ensure that consumers are treated fairly, have access to transparent information, and are protected from fraudulent or deceptive practices.

Regulatory Oversight and Enforcement: Regulatory compliance is reinforced by regulatory bodies that oversee

financial institutions, enforce compliance, and impose penalties for non-compliance. These regulatory authorities monitor institutions' compliance with regulations, conduct audits and examinations, and take enforcement actions when violations are identified. Such oversight ensures accountability and promotes a culture of compliance within the financial industry.

By adhering to regulatory compliance requirements, financial institutions are expected to minimize risks, enhance stability, and maintain the confidence of investors and the public. Compliance management systems, internal controls, and risk management frameworks are utilized by financial institutions to meet regulatory obligations and proactively manage risks.

Overall, the theory of regulatory compliance underscores the role of regulations in promoting financial stability, mitigating risks, protecting consumers, and maintaining the integrity of financial systems. Compliance with these regulations helps build a resilient financial sector that can withstand shocks and contribute to overall economic stability.

Preserving Competitive Market Environment

Preserving a competitive market environment is essential for fostering innovation, encouraging efficiency, and benefiting consumers. The theory of regulatory compliance is closely linked to this objective, as it involves establishing and enforcing rules and regulations that promote fair competition and prevent anti-competitive practices.

The theory of regulatory compliance is based on the idea that regulatory frameworks can help create a level playing field for all market participants. By setting clear rules and standards, regulators aim to ensure that businesses operate within the bounds of fair competition. Compliance with these regulations helps prevent monopolistic behavior, collusion, price-fixing, and other practices that could harm competition.

Here are a few key principles related to preserving a competitive market environment and the theory of regulatory compliance:

Anti-Trust Laws: Anti-trust laws are designed to promote competition by preventing the abuse of market power. They prohibit practices such as monopolies, cartels, price-fixing, and mergers that may substantially lessen competition. Regulators enforce these laws to preserve a competitive landscape and protect consumer interests.

Market Entry and Exit: Regulatory frameworks should facilitate the entry of new businesses into the market while allowing existing ones to exit if they are unable to compete effectively. Barriers to entry, such as excessive licensing requirements or unfair regulations, can hinder competition. Regulatory compliance should aim to reduce these barriers and ensure fair access for all participants.

Consumer Protection: A competitive market environment should prioritize consumer welfare. Regulatory compliance plays a crucial role in safeguarding consumer interests by ensuring transparency, fair pricing, quality standards, and adequate information disclosure. Consumer protection laws

and regulations address issues such as misleading advertising, product safety, and fair dispute resolution mechanisms.

Enforcement and Monitoring: Regulatory agencies are responsible for enforcing compliance with regulations. They monitor market activities, investigate potential violations, and take appropriate enforcement actions when necessary. Effective enforcement requires sufficient resources, expertise, and collaboration among regulators, ensuring a level playing field for all participants.

International Cooperation: In a globalized economy, preserving a competitive market environment requires international cooperation. Collaboration between regulatory authorities across jurisdictions can help address cross-border anti-competitive practices, harmonize regulatory standards, and promote fair competition in the global marketplace.

Overall, the theory of regulatory compliance supports the notion that well-designed and effectively enforced regulations can foster a competitive market environment. By promoting fair competition, preventing anti-competitive practices, and protecting consumer interests, regulatory compliance contributes to a healthy and vibrant marketplace.

Establishing Trust and Credibility

Establishing trust and credibility is crucial for regulatory compliance efforts. The theory of regulatory compliance recognizes that trust is essential in fostering cooperation between regulatory authorities, businesses, and other

stakeholders. Trust is built when regulations are transparent, consistently enforced, and perceived as fair and unbiased.

Here are some key aspects of establishing trust and credibility in the context of regulatory compliance:

Transparency: Transparency is a fundamental principle in regulatory compliance. Regulations and their enforcement processes should be clearly communicated and accessible to all stakeholders. Openness helps build trust by ensuring that the rules are known and understood by businesses and individuals, reducing uncertainty and promoting voluntary compliance.

Consistency: Consistency in applying regulations is critical for building trust. Regulators should strive to enforce regulations uniformly and without favoritism or discrimination. Consistent enforcement establishes a level playing field, fostering trust among market participants who know that everyone is subject to the same rules.

Accountability: Regulatory authorities should be accountable for their actions. This includes being transparent about decision-making processes, justifying regulatory actions, and providing avenues for recourse and appeal. Accountability mechanisms help prevent abuse of regulatory power and build trust by demonstrating fairness and impartiality.

Collaboration and Engagement: Regulatory compliance efforts benefit from collaboration and engagement with various stakeholders. This includes businesses, industry associations, consumer groups, and experts. Involving stakeholders in the

regulatory process helps ensure that regulations are practical, effective, and well-understood. Collaboration also enhances trust by incorporating diverse perspectives and building consensus.

Risk-Based Approach: A risk-based approach to regulation can contribute to trust and credibility. It involves assessing risks, prioritizing enforcement efforts based on the potential harm to the public or the market, and proportionately allocating regulatory resources. This approach demonstrates that regulatory actions are driven by objective evaluations and the need to address significant risks, enhancing trust in the regulatory system.

Continuous Improvement: Regulatory compliance should be a dynamic and evolving process. Regular evaluation and improvement of regulations and enforcement mechanisms are essential for maintaining trust and credibility. Regulators should engage in periodic reviews, solicit feedback from stakeholders, and adapt regulations to changing market dynamics and emerging challenges.

Effective Communication: Clear and effective communication is vital for establishing trust. Regulators should communicate expectations, obligations, and changes in regulations in a timely and accessible manner. Communication channels should be open to addressing queries, providing guidance, and clarifying regulatory requirements, fostering trust by ensuring transparency and promoting compliance.

In summary, trust and credibility are foundational elements of successful regulatory compliance. By promoting transparency,

consistency, accountability, collaboration, and effective communication, regulatory authorities can establish a trusted regulatory framework that fosters compliance and cooperation among stakeholders.

Penalties and Consequences of Non-Compliance

Regulatory compliance refers to the act of adhering to laws, regulations, guidelines, and standards set forth by governing bodies or regulatory agencies. Non-compliance occurs when individuals, organizations, or businesses fail to meet these requirements. The penalties and consequences of non-compliance can vary depending on the specific regulations and jurisdictions involved. Here are some common penalties and consequences:

Fines and Monetary Penalties: Regulatory agencies often have the authority to impose fines and monetary penalties for non-compliance. The amount of the penalty may vary depending on the severity of the violation and the regulatory framework in place. These fines can be substantial and can significantly impact the finances of non-compliant entities.

Legal Proceedings and Lawsuits: Non-compliance may lead to legal action, including lawsuits filed by affected parties or regulatory bodies. This can result in costly litigation, potential damages, and a tarnished reputation.

License Revocation or Suspension: Certain industries and professions require licenses or permits to operate legally. Non-compliance can lead to the revocation or suspension of

these licenses, effectively shutting down the business or preventing individuals from practicing their profession.

Regulatory Audits and Inspections: Regulatory agencies may conduct audits and inspections to assess compliance. Non-compliant entities may face increased scrutiny, additional audits, or more frequent inspections, leading to disruption of operations and additional costs.

Reputational Damage: Non-compliance can harm an organization's reputation, leading to loss of customer trust, decreased sales, and difficulty attracting new customers. Negative publicity and media attention can have long-lasting effects on brand value and perception.

Corrective Actions and Remediation Costs: In many cases, non-compliant entities are required to take corrective actions to address the violations. This may involve implementing new policies, procedures, or systems, as well as investing in training and education. The costs associated with these remediation efforts can be significant.

Criminal Charges and Penalties: In cases of serious non-compliance, intentional violations, or fraudulent activities, criminal charges may be pursued. This can result in fines, imprisonment, or both, depending on the severity of the offense.

The theory of regulatory compliance seeks to understand why individuals or organizations choose to comply or not comply with regulations. Factors influencing compliance behavior include perceived legitimacy of regulations, trust in regulatory

agencies, the presence of effective enforcement mechanisms, and the perceived costs and benefits of compliance. The theory emphasizes the importance of clear communication, consistent enforcement, and proportionate penalties to achieve higher compliance rates.

Compliance Programs and Frameworks

Compliance programs and frameworks are designed to help organizations establish and maintain a culture of regulatory compliance. They provide a structured approach to understanding and meeting regulatory requirements, mitigating risks, and promoting ethical behavior. Additionally, compliance programs help organizations detect and address non-compliance issues promptly and effectively.

Here are some common compliance programs and frameworks:

Compliance Management System (CMS): A CMS is a comprehensive framework that encompasses policies, procedures, processes, and controls to manage compliance within an organization. It includes elements such as risk assessment, compliance training, monitoring and auditing, incident reporting, and corrective action planning.

ISO 19600: This international standard provides guidelines for establishing, implementing, evaluating, and improving a compliance management system. It emphasizes a risk-based approach to compliance and provides a framework for organizations to identify, analyze, and address their compliance obligations effectively.

COSO Framework: The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) developed a framework that focuses on internal controls and risk management. While not specifically geared towards compliance, it provides a solid foundation for managing compliance risks within an organization.

Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG): The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide guidance for organizations on establishing effective compliance programs. They outline specific factors that organizations should consider when developing compliance programs, such as conducting risk assessments, implementing training and communication programs, and monitoring compliance.

Principle-Based Approach: The principle-based approach to compliance focuses on establishing a set of core principles and values that guide an organization's compliance efforts. It emphasizes ethical conduct, integrity, and accountability as the foundation for compliance programs. This approach encourages employees to make ethical decisions and act in accordance with the organization's values.

The theory of regulatory compliance explores the factors that influence compliance behavior and the effectiveness of compliance programs. It recognizes that compliance is not solely driven by the fear of penalties but also by factors such as organizational culture, perceived legitimacy of regulations, and the presence of strong internal controls. The theory suggests that effective compliance programs should:

Clearly communicate regulatory requirements and expectations to employees and stakeholders.

Foster a culture of compliance by promoting ethical behavior, accountability, and integrity.

Provide training and education to employees to enhance their understanding of compliance obligations.

Implement monitoring and auditing mechanisms to detect and address non-compliance promptly.

Establish strong internal controls and risk management processes to mitigate compliance risks.

Encourage reporting of potential compliance issues and provide channels for anonymous reporting.

Continuously evaluate and improve the compliance program based on feedback and changes in regulations.

By understanding the theory of regulatory compliance and implementing effective compliance programs, organizations can enhance their ability to meet regulatory requirements, manage risks, and uphold ethical standards.

Role of Technology in Regulatory Compliance and monitoring and reporting tools

Technology plays a crucial role in regulatory compliance by providing tools and systems that help organizations monitor and report their adherence to regulatory requirements. Here

are some key ways technology supports regulatory compliance:

Automation and Workflow Management: Technology enables the automation of various compliance processes, such as data collection, analysis, and reporting. Workflow management systems help streamline compliance tasks by providing clear processes and guidelines, ensuring consistent and efficient execution.

Data Management and Analysis: Compliance often involves handling large volumes of data. Technology solutions, such as data management systems and analytics tools, facilitate the collection, storage, organization, and analysis of data for compliance purposes. These systems can identify patterns, anomalies, and trends in the data, helping organizations detect and address compliance risks.

Monitoring and Surveillance: Technology enables real-time monitoring and surveillance of activities, transactions, and communications to identify potential compliance violations. Advanced monitoring tools use algorithms and machine learning techniques to detect suspicious behavior, fraud, market manipulation, or any non-compliant activities.

Reporting and Documentation: Compliance requires accurate and timely reporting to regulatory authorities. Technology offers reporting tools that help automate the creation of regulatory reports, ensuring the required information is captured, organized, and submitted in the appropriate format. These tools often include templates, data mapping capabilities, and integration with existing systems.

Audit Trail and Documentation Management: Technology allows organizations to maintain a comprehensive audit trail and documentation of compliance activities. Digital systems enable the secure storage, retrieval, and tracking of compliance-related documents, making it easier to demonstrate compliance during audits or investigations.

Risk Assessment and Compliance Monitoring: Technology supports risk assessment processes by providing tools for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing compliance risks. Compliance monitoring tools can continuously track regulatory changes and updates, ensuring organizations stay informed and adapt their compliance programs accordingly.

Training and Education: Technology can be utilized to deliver compliance training and educational materials to employees and stakeholders. Online learning platforms, webinars, and interactive modules can provide accessible and engaging compliance training programs, ensuring widespread understanding of regulatory requirements and promoting a culture of compliance.

Overall, technology plays a vital role in enhancing the efficiency, accuracy, and effectiveness of regulatory compliance efforts. By leveraging technology, organizations can better manage compliance requirements, mitigate risks, and ensure adherence to regulations in an increasingly complex regulatory landscape.

Conclusion Recap of the importance of the theory of regulatory compliance

The theory of regulatory compliance is of great importance in various domains, particularly in legal and business contexts. It refers to the set of rules, regulations, and standards that individuals, organizations, and industries must follow to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

Here are some key points highlighting the importance of the theory of regulatory compliance:

Legal Compliance: Regulatory compliance ensures that individuals and organizations adhere to laws and regulations set forth by governing bodies. This helps maintain law and order in society and promotes fairness, transparency, and accountability.

Risk Mitigation: Compliance measures help identify and mitigate potential risks associated with non-compliance. By following regulations, organizations can minimize legal, financial, reputational, and operational risks. Compliance frameworks often include risk assessment and management components, enabling proactive risk mitigation.

Consumer Protection: Compliance regulations often aim to protect consumers' rights and interests. Compliance with consumer protection laws ensures fair business practices, prevents fraud, and enhances consumer trust in products and services.

Data Privacy and Security: In the digital age, data privacy and security have become crucial concerns. Regulatory compliance frameworks, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), enforce strict guidelines for handling personal data. Compliance helps safeguard sensitive information, maintain privacy, and prevent data breaches.

Ethical Standards: Compliance extends beyond legal obligations and encompasses ethical standards. It encourages organizations to adopt ethical business practices, such as fair competition, anti-corruption measures, and environmental sustainability. Compliance frameworks often incorporate ethical guidelines to promote responsible conduct.

Industry Standards: Many industries have specific regulatory compliance requirements tailored to their unique characteristics and risks. Compliance with industry-specific regulations ensures safety, quality, and standardization within the sector. Examples include regulations in healthcare, finance, energy, and manufacturing.

Reputation and Trust: Compliance with regulations builds a positive reputation for individuals and organizations. It demonstrates commitment to legal and ethical standards, fostering trust among customers, investors, and other stakeholders. A strong reputation for compliance can lead to increased business opportunities and competitive advantage.

Legal Consequences: Non-compliance with regulatory requirements can have severe legal consequences, including fines, penalties, sanctions, and legal liabilities. Violations can result in damaged reputation, loss of business licenses, and

even criminal charges. Compliance helps organizations avoid legal pitfalls and maintain a good standing with regulatory authorities.

Global Business Landscape: With increasing globalization, organizations often need to navigate complex regulatory frameworks across multiple jurisdictions. Understanding and complying with international regulations is essential for expanding businesses, facilitating international trade, and avoiding legal disputes.

Continuous Improvement: The theory of regulatory compliance emphasizes the need for continuous improvement. Compliance programs encourage regular monitoring, self-assessment, and adaptability to evolving regulations. This fosters a culture of compliance and enables organizations to stay up to date with changing legal requirements.

In summary, the theory of regulatory compliance plays a vital role in promoting legality, ethical conduct, risk management, and trust in various domains. It ensures adherence to laws, protects consumers, mitigates risks, and helps organizations thrive in a complex regulatory landscape.

Discussion on regulatory compliance, licensing measurement and monitoring systems

When it comes to licensing measurement and monitoring systems, risk assessment is the driving force in making licensing decisions, remembering the mantra: “Do No Harm“. There have been several posts giving examples in how one

does this with risk assessment and key indicator methodologies which are the predominant approaches to differential monitoring. These methodologies are derived by two very different mathematical models, one based upon Likert scaling and weighting; the other based on predictive scaling and regulatory compliance history. However, what they have in common is a basic risk aversion.

With risk assessment rules, the selection process via a weighting methodology is critical in selecting those rules that place individuals at greatest risk of harm, and then making certain that these rules are always in regulatory compliance. With predictive rules, the selection process is through regulatory compliance history in general as well as with each individual rule. The key here is to make certain that the effect size is sufficiently large so that there are no false negatives.

The licensing decision process needs to ensure at all times that there is no regulatory non-compliance with the risk assessment rules and that there are no false negatives where general regulatory non-compliance is found with some other rule when the predictive rules are all in-compliance. In order to have an effective and efficient differential monitoring approach both these conditions must be met for the licensing system to work as it is intended with abbreviated inspection reviews. It is only by having this in place will a licensing agency feel confident that the necessary risk mitigation has been implemented in making licensing decisions.

The next two posts are intimately tied together and should be read in close proximity of each other to understand the methodologies presented.

Risk Assessment and Key Indicator Methodologies

Risk Assessment and Key Indicator methodologies are two approaches utilized in differential monitoring systems for generating an abbreviated inspection by only looking at a core set of rules based upon statistical predictor or risk assessment algorithms. In this post the matrix (pictured below) utilized to generate these core sets of rules are depicted and with a matrix that determines their respective validation status based upon subsequent studies.

The first matrix display (KIM Matrix) deals with the Key Indicator Methodology (KIM) and demonstrates how key indicator rules are determined by measuring each potential rule and comparing it to the regulatory compliance history for the respective set of all rules for a given jurisdiction in which the programs are grouped into either a high (Full or substantial regulatory compliance with all rules) or low compliant groups (several or more violations of rules). From the matrix, it is clear that for a rule to become an indicator rule, there needs to be a very high correlation between the rule being in compliance with the high group and out of compliance with the low group. It is only when this occurs that the rule will distinguish between high and low compliance and be a predictor rule. The other two cells should occur less frequently but there will be some occurrences when these do occur and when they do, these rules will not make the threshold of becoming indicator rules. So Key Indicator Predictor Rules increase performance by predicting overall regulatory compliance.

The second matrix display (RAM Matrix) deals with the Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) and demonstrates how risk assessment rules are determined by measuring each potential rule by the amount of risk of morbidity or mortality a client is placed in because of non-compliance with the specific rule and how likely will this occur. As one can see, the cell which contains high risk rules, and they are likely to occur would be included on the risk assessment tool. All the other cells are color coded in decreasing risk and likelihood categories and a jurisdiction can determine the appropriate thresholds. More risk rules would be included for a risk aversive approach while less risk rules would be included for a more lenient approach or because the number of key indicator rules are sufficient to ensure the health and safety of the clients being served. So, Risk Assessment Rules decrease risk to clients but are not predictive rules of overall regulatory compliance.

The last matrix display (KIM/RAM Validation Matrix) is used after the KIM and RAM tools are actually used to validate that they are working as intended. KIM should be statistically predicting overall compliance with all the rules (Rules in Compliance cell), while RAM should be mitigating risk in the program by always having the high-risk rules in compliance (also Rules in Compliance cell). Part of the KIM validation strategy is that the opposite should also occur in that when the KIM tool has indicator rules out of compliance, it should statistically predict rules out of compliance with other rules (the Rules Out of Compliance cell). Something that can occur but needs to be eliminated are the false negatives in which the KIM is in compliance but there is non-compliance detected elsewhere in the rules. When full compliance is used for the high compliant group in the KIM Matrix, this eliminates this

from happening. But if substantial compliance is used as the criterion for the high compliant group, then this can become problematic. If substantial compliance is used as the threshold for the high compliant group, a multiplier needs to be applied to rule out the likelihood of false negatives (please see the blog post on this algorithm adjustment posted back in January of this year or look at the description provided below the matrices). False positives are possible also but are not of overall concern from a safety point of view but are a concern from a psychometric standpoint and additional research needs to be done to determine the cause.

KIM Matrix

KIM Generator	High Compliant Group	Low Compliant Group
Rule In Compliance	Yes: OK	No
Rule Out of Compliance	No	Yes: OK

RAM Matrix

High Risk/High Likely	High Risk/Med Likely	High Risk/Low Likely
Med Risk/High Likely	Med Risk/Med Likely	Med Risk/Low Likely
Low Risk/High Likely	Low Risk/Med Likely	Low Risk/Low Likely

KIM/RAM Validation Matrix

KIM/RAM Validator	Rules In Compliance	Rules Out of Compliance
KIM/RAM In Compliance	Yes/Yes: OK KIM/RAM	Yes/No: False Negative
KIM/RAM Out Compliance	No/Yes: False Positive	No/No: OK KIM

Hopefully this helps licensing administrators, licensing researchers, and regulatory scientists to see the logic behind the differential monitoring methodologies of key indicator and risk assessment and how best to take advantage of both.

There are two other blog posts on the risk assessment (RAM) and key indicator (KIM) matrices posted last year (2022) and the year before (2021) demonstrating differences and similarities. In this post, there is an attempt to build upon the previous posts and to enhance some of these differences and similarities. Let's start with a narrative description followed by a chart/matrix comparison.

Risk Assessment (RAM) is generally depicted as a 3 x 3 matrix (pictured below) with risk on one axis and prevalence on the other axis; while Key Indicators (KIM) is generally depicted as a 2 x 2 matrix in which one axis measures individual rule compliance and the other axis measures overall regulatory compliance or compliance history. RAM deals with individual rules with a weight while KIM deals with

aggregate rules and high and low regulatory compliance. RAM rules are heavily weighted while KIM rules are medium weighted. RAM is hardly ever out of compliance while KIM has a good deal of non-compliance to distinguish the high compliant group from the low compliant group. RAM uses likert scale and means; KIM uses correlational analyses and prediction. RAM is expert opinion while KIM is data driven

RAM/KIM Matrix: Risk Assessment and Key Indicators: 3×3 Matrix
Demonstrating Relationships between **KIM** and *RAM*

High Risk/High Prevalence	High Risk/Med Prevalence	*High Risk/Low Prevalence*
Med Risk/High Prevalence	**Med Risk/Med Prevalence**	Med Risk/Low Prevalence
Low Risk/High Prevalence	Low Risk/Med Prevalence	Low Risk/Low Prevalence

In the above 3 x 3 Matrix: Risk x Prevalence are listed across the axis, in which *RAM* is preventing high risk, high prevalence but in reality *RAM rules* are very low prevalence, low non-compliance. **KIM rules** are usually med risk and prevalence.

The above matrix and narrative provides additional enhancements to the differences and similarities between risk assessment and key indicator rules. As one can see, there are some basic differences but at the same time there is a deep common structure that underlies both. These are important

attributes to consider before using these statistical methodologies as part of a differential monitoring approach. But the bottom line when using either RAM or KIM, or RAM+KIM, all RAM and KIM rules must be in compliance at all times. Remember it is not about more or less rules in total, it is about compliance with the right rules.

Let's take this to the next step and think about this more broadly and relate it to the larger research literature dealing with businesses. Risk assessment and key performance indicators (KPIs) are two important concepts in business management. Risk assessment is the process of identifying, evaluating, and managing risks to an organization's objectives. KPIs are metrics that measure an organization's performance against its objectives.

The two concepts are related in that risk assessment can help organizations identify and prioritize risks that could impact their KPIs. For example, if an organization's KPI is to increase sales by 10%, then risk assessment can help the organization identify risks that could prevent it from achieving this goal, such as a competitor launching a new product or a change in customer behavior.

Once risks have been identified, organizations can develop mitigation strategies to reduce the likelihood or impact of those risks. KPIs can be used to track the effectiveness of these mitigation strategies. For example, if an organization is concerned about a competitor launching a new product, it could track its sales data to see if there has been a decrease in sales since the competitor launched its product.

By integrating risk assessment and KPIs, organizations can improve their ability to identify, manage, and mitigate risks to their objectives. This can help organizations achieve their goals and objectives more effectively.

Here are some examples of how risk assessment and KPIs can be used together:

- A bank might use risk assessment to identify the risks of fraud and theft. The bank could then use KPIs to track the number of fraudulent transactions and the amount of money lost to fraud. This information could be used to develop mitigation strategies, such as implementing new security measures or training employees on how to spot and prevent fraud.
- A manufacturing company might use risk assessment to identify the risks of product recalls and safety incidents. The company could then use KPIs to track the number of product recalls and the number of safety incidents. This information could be used to develop mitigation strategies, such as improving product quality or implementing new safety procedures.
- A retail company might use risk assessment to identify the risks of natural disasters and supply chain disruptions. The company could then use KPIs to track the number of natural disasters that occur in its region and the number of supply chain disruptions that occur. This information could be used to develop mitigation strategies, such as developing contingency plans or building up inventory.

By integrating risk assessment and KPIs, organizations can improve their ability to identify, manage, and mitigate risks to their objectives. This can help organizations achieve their goals and objectives more effectively.

I want to continue the discussion related to the relationship between risk assessment and key performance indicators. I have posted about this relationship and other assorted concepts and ideas related to it in several previous blog posts I posted earlier this year. In this post I would like to see if I can tie some of these ideas and concepts together and show how risk and performance are more closely related and how to take advantage of this relationship.

These ideas percolated from a conversation and discussions I have been having with a colleague about a webinar we will be doing together where he suggested the use of a graphic to help to explain the essence of key performance indicators. His graphic was to be an airplane cockpit and all the gauges present on the dashboard that a pilot is looking at. A great deal of data and information to process but s/he focused on about 5-6 gauges that were the most important in flying the plane and really told the pilot if things were ok or not and when s/he needed to check the other gauges because these key performance indicator and risk assessment gauges were telling s/he something was not quite right. I would guess that two of these gauges were the altimeter and speed gauges which I would include as risk assessment gauges and a third gauge would have been the fuel gauge which I would include as a key performance indicator.

Why did I break these gauges down into the two major areas of risk assessment and key performance? Here is my thinking: the altimeter tells the pilot how close to the ground and a potential crash and the speed helps to prevent a stall of the aircraft. Both are high risk factors and things we would want to mitigate. The fuel tank is important to know how much fuel the pilot has left; in, and of itself, not necessarily a risk factor unless it becomes too low but will impact performance because it determines how far the pilot can fly the plane.

A similar scenario could be played out with driving a car. Speed is the risk factor as it increases, while the gas tank gauge is the key performance indicator determining how far we can go and how much we are getting per gallon of gas which is an indicator on many newer models.

Let's try this out in a totally different industry and scenario, such as the pharmaceutical/drug industry. When finding out if a new drug will work or not, there is a delicate balance of risk-benefit or risk-performance. Same concept, just different terminology being used. For risk assessment, either not taking the drug or taking too much of the drug will not be in the best interest of the patient. Too little or not at all the patient dies because the disease progresses. If the patient takes too much of the drug, given the side effects, the patient dies. The key performance indicator or benefit is finding the right target dosage of the drug which effectively keeps the patient alive and gets better or at least not any worse.

Another example, one that I share somewhat reluctantly because some people may take offense but I think it is an effective example, the Ten Commandments. I actually have

posted this earlier in a blog post as an example if one is interested in looking at this in more detail (May 2022). With the Ten Commandments, think of "Thou Shalt not Kill" as a risk assessment rule and "Thou Shall not Steal" as a key performance indicator. Obviously the consequences of the first are much greater than the second where one is literally stealing someone's life, which is the underlying structure of the relationship between risk assessment and key performance indicators.

So let's delve into this relationship of performance and risk mitigation based upon the above examples and see how they are all tied together. Risk mitigation (Do No Harm) is sort of the book ends of the relationship, too much or too little is not a good thing, while key performance (Do Good) is somewhere in between balancing effectiveness with efficiency and finding the right balance of rules and recommended standards (The essence of the Theory of Regulatory Compliance). Remember I am addressing regulatory compliance data and not social science data in general although it would be interesting to see how this relationship of performance and risk assessment plays out in the larger context of the social sciences. I have a funny feeling that many relationships of social science variables are more nonlinear than linear in nature.

How are risk assessment and key performance indicators determined? Risk assessment rules are generally determined by expert opinion and group consensus either using or not using a Likert type Scale (***Stepping Stones to Caring for Our Children*** and ***Caring for Our Children Basics*** are examples). Key performance indicators are determined from actual data, generally regulatory compliance history utilizing a regulatory

compliance statistical methodology that results in the rule's predictive ability (the statistical methodology is highlighted on this website in the publications section as well as on the **National Association for Regulatory Administration's website (**https://www.naralicensing.org/key-indicators) (***ASPE's Thirteen Quality Indicators*** and the ***Early Childhood Program Quality Indicators Scale*** are examples (see previous blog posts on all these)). From a licensing measurement perspective, risk assessment rules are generally always in regulatory compliance because the rules place clients at such great risk; while key performance indicators do not place clients at high risk as with risk assessment rules, generally have some non-compliance, just enough to distinguish between the high performers and the mediocre performers.

This relationship is made possible because of the regulatory compliance theory of diminishing returns/the ceiling effect between regulatory compliance and program quality where we are really forced to look for a paradigm shift when it comes to licensing and program monitoring. The "One Size Fits All" a very absolute approach needs to be replaced with a more relative approach, such as "Differential Monitoring" and once this paradigm shift is made it naturally leads us to identifying risk assessment rules and key performance indicator rules. It really changes our frame of reference in establishing a proper balance between regulatory compliance and program quality standards.

To summarize, too few or too many rules are not a good outcome, it is finding the proper balance of the "right rules", finding that balance between effectiveness and efficiency,

between risk mitigation and optimun performance. Let me leave you with this statement as an algorithm where TRC = Theory of Regulatory Compliance; RA = Risk Assessment; KI = Key Performance Indicator; RC = Regulatory Compliance; and PQ = Program Quality: ***TRC*** = ***∑(RA + KI)*** => ***∑(RC + PQ)***

The Public Policy Implications of the Regulatory Compliance Theory of Diminishing Returns, Regulatory Compliance Scaling, and the Program Quality Scoring Matrix along with Integrative Monitoring

This technical research note/abstract provides a data matrix (below table) depicting the relationship between regulatory compliance and program quality. The data clearly demonstrate the regulatory compliance theory of diminishing returns which depicts the ceiling or plateau effect in this relationship between regulatory compliance data and program quality data. It also shows the difficulty one will have in distinguishing program quality differences at the full and high regulatory compliance levels but the ease in distinguishing program quality between low regulatory compliance and high regulatory compliance levels.

This abstract unifies several separately developed regulatory compliance metrics and concepts by combining them into a single technical research note. The Regulatory Compliance Theory of Diminishing Returns (2019), The Regulatory Compliance Scale (2022), Integrative Monitoring (2023), and the Ten Principles of Regulatory Compliance Measurement (2023) have all been presented separately (all these papers are available for the interested reader on ***SSRN***

(https://www.ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/***) or the Journal of Regulatory Science (***https://regsci-ojs-tamu.tdl.org/regsci/***)***. This abstract shows how they are all related and their importance in moving forward with regulatory compliance measurement in the future. The four jurisdiction's (US National, Southern State, Western State, Canada) final reports are available at https://www.naralicensing.org/key-indicators for the interested reader.

Relationship of Regulatory Compliance Scale and Program Quality in Four Jurisdictions Matrix

Reg Comp Scale	US National	Southern State	Western State	Canada
Full	3.03 (75)	3.40 (15)	4.07 (82)	37.4 (44)
High	3.13 (135)	4.00 (20)	4.28 (69)	38.5 (33)
Mid	2.87 (143)	3.16 (32)	4.17 (163)	29.1 (36)
Low	2.65 (28)	2.38 (2)	3.93 (71)	----------
Significan	***p < .001***	***p < .05***	***p < .001***	***p < .01***

Legend:

US National = CLASS-IS scores

Southern State and Western State = ECERS-R scores

Canada = Canadian Program Quality Tool scores

One-way ANOVA was performed on the data in each jurisdiction.

Regulatory Compliance Scale (Reg Comp Scale (RCS)):

Full = 0 violations (100% regulatory compliance with all rules/regulations)

High = 1-2 violations; Mid = 3-9 violations; Low = 10+ violations

The number in parentheses is the number of programs assessed in each jurisdiction.



Legend: *1 = Full; 2 = High; 3 = Mid; 4 = Low.*

Blue = US National; Orange = Southern State; Gray = Western State. Canada was left off because of different scaling.

The above data matrix display is important for the early care and education (ECE) field because it demonstrates the relationship between licensing via regulatory compliance data measurement and program quality scores via CLASS, ERS, and the Canadian Quality Tool. The CLASS and ERS are well grounded ECE program quality tools while the Canadian Quality Tool is a new addition to the field.

The data displayed show that a ceiling or plateau effect (quality scores did not change significantly as was generally the case with lower levels of regulatory compliance) occurred in all four jurisdictions when the regulatory compliance levels or the absence of rule/regulatory violations were compared to program quality scores as one moves from high regulatory

compliance to full regulatory compliance (0 violations or 100% regulatory compliance with all rules). From a public policy point of view, it would lead us to believe that licensing is not the best avenue to program quality and that another intervention, such as Quality Rating and Improvement Systems (QRIS), would be necessary to enhance quality programming. What regulatory compliance and licensing does do is prevent harm and keep children in healthy and safe environments (please go to https://rikinstitute.com for examples to support this claim). So, from a public policy point of view, licensing is accomplishing its goals. But don't expect licensing to address quality programming. For that to occur, either we need to continue our present system of licensing and Quality Initiatives, such as QRIS, as an add on; or infuse quality into the rules and regulations which has been suggested via a new form program monitoring called: integrative monitoring.

There are some other takeaways from the above data matrix that are significant contributions to the regulatory compliance measurement research literature, such as, how skewed the data are. Focus more on the number of programs rather than their quality scores for each of the Regulatory Compliance Scale levels. You will notice that most programs in each of the jurisdictions are either in full or high regulatory compliance and that there are few programs at the low end of the regulatory compliance scale. There is an unusually very high percentage of programs at full compliance. This also contributes to a lack of variance in the upper end of the regulatory compliance scale which can be problematic as indicated in the previous paragraph in distinguishing between the quality levels of programs.

The importance of these four studies and the summary matrix above is to provide a context in how licensing and regulatory compliance data should be used in making public policy decisions, for example: is it more effective and efficient to require high or substantial regulatory compliance than full regulatory compliance with all rules and regulations to be granted a full license to operate? It appears prudent to continue with the US emphasis on QRIS as an add on quality initiative, especially in states where rules/regulations are at a minimal level. In Canada their emphasis has been more in line with an integrative monitoring approach in which quality elements are built in or infused within the rules and regulations themselves. This approach appears to work in a similar fashion and is an effective public policy initiative. Either approach appears to be an effective modality to increasing program quality; but are both equally efficient.

The purpose of this last RIKINotes post is to point out the intersections, differences and similarities of integrative, differential/inferential and coordinated monitoring as used in the monitoring of human service programs. Program monitoring has changed over the years in that not only has it grown in the types of monitoring done, such as process, compliance, outcome monitoring, etc.; but also, in the functional aspects of monitoring as delineated with integrative, differential, and coordinated monitoring. Much has been written in the research literature about the types of monitoring but not as much regarding the functional aspects of monitoring probably because it is much newer and has grown with the various types of monitoring being used in different contexts.

Coordinated monitoring deals with monitoring across similar service types, for example, in early care and education, monitoring would be done using similar standards in Head Start, child care, preschool, etc. This is an effective and efficient approach which has been demonstrated through the creation and dissemination of *Caring for Our Children Basics* as a core set of standards for all these various settings. The US Dept of Health and Human Services has advocated this particular approach.

Differential monitoring focusing on the use of abbreviated or targeted inspections of programs that have a history of high regulatory compliance with specific rules or standards. It means spending more time and doing a more comprehensive review of those programs having difficulty complying with specific rules, these can be based upon risk assessment or predictive value of overall compliance. This is a very efficient approach which has been demonstrated to save time in monitoring reviews. Many states in the USA and provinces in Canada use this approach. The US Office of Head Start has experimented with the approach.

Instrument-based program monitoring utilizes instruments, tools, or checklists for recording all data when a review or inspection is completed. It is different from the case review or anecdotal type of record keeping. This approach started in the late 1970's, early 1980's when it was introduced by the Children's Services Monitoring Transfer Consortium, a federally funded research project consisting of California, Michigan, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and New York City. Its development occurred parallel with the development of

differential monitoring but with particular emphasis on the metrics or measurement domain when it came to tool development. The ***Child Development Program Evaluation Scale*** was a major tool developed from this initiative.

Integrative monitoring is a relatively new approach to monitoring in which the emphasis is on integrating regulatory compliance rules with quality programming standards. Note the emphasis is on the rules and standards and not on who gets applied to those rules and standards nor how they get applied. However, combining integrative monitoring with differential monitoring is an interesting research focus which could be a very effective and efficient approach in combining these two perspectives. In the past, licensing and quality programming have generally been in their own silos when it comes to program monitoring. Integrative monitoring removes them from these silos and suggests building a continuous metric that starts with the health and safety aspects of rules and adds in the quality pieces on top of the rules. Presently, quality initiatives, such as Quality Rating and Improvement Systems, Accreditation, and Professional Development systems are examples of standards that could be used to build upon health and safety licensing rules.

There appears to be interest in pursuing an integrative monitoring approach in several jurisdictions in the early care and education field but this interest extends beyond and has been suggested more broadly by a recent article published in the *Journal of Regulatory Science* by Freer & Fiene (2023). *Regulatory compliance and quality programming: Constraints and opportunities for integration*, Volume 11, Number 1, 1-10 (***Journal of Regulatory Science***). The interested reader may

want to take a look at the article, it does provide a unique model for pursuing integrative monitoring. Also, this eHandBook on *Licensing Measurement and Monitoring Systems: Regulatory science applied to human services regulatory administration* available at **https://RIKInstitute.com.** provides the basics of licensing measurement and program monitoring metrics.

So where does all this lead to. Potentially to an expansion of the ***Regulatory Compliance Scale*** to a new proposed ***Licensing and Quality Scale.***

Previous RIKINotes posts have introduced the Regulatory Compliance Scale (RCS), in this post, based upon the latest regulatory science research, this RCS can be expanded to a more comprehensive and all-inclusive Licensing and Quality Scale (LQS) which will seven components related to licensing the program quality.

The seven components are the following: the Regulatory Compliance Scale, risk assessment rules, key indicator rules, quality indicator standards, complaints about the facility, key indicator criteria being satisfied, and overall regulatory compliance history.

The Regulatory Compliance Scale (RCS-see table below) is a Likert type scale that has 1 – 7 scaling where 7 = full regulatory compliance (no rule violations); 5 = substantial regulatory compliance (1-2 rule violations); 3 = moderate regulatory compliance (3-9 rule violations); and 1 = low regulatory compliance (10+ rule violations). The RCS is based

upon 40 years of research and the corresponding international regulatory compliance and quality databases.

Regulatory Compliance Scale (RCS)

RCS	Level	Violations
Full	7	0 violations
Substantial	5	1-2 violations
Moderate	3	3-9 violations
Low	1	10+ violations

Risk Assessment Rules (RAR) are those rules which have been determined to place children at greatest risk for mortality/morbidity. These identified rules are generally always in full regulatory compliance.

Key Indicator Rules (KIR) are those rules that are statistically predictive of overall regulatory compliance with all rules. These identified rules are generally in the mid-range of regulatory compliance and are very predictive between distinguishing those high-quality programs vs those that are not.

Quality Indicator Standards (QIS) are those standards that are statistically predictive of overall program quality on various dimensions such as staffing, curriculum, parental involvement, and teacher behaviors in the classroom.

Complaints can be any indications that there are issues at the specific facility that a concerned individual is reporting to the state licensing agency which require follow up and an abbreviated inspection review.

Key Indicator Criteria are the specific criteria which make programs eligible for a Key Indicator Abbreviated Inspection. Examples of Key Indicator Criteria are the following: no change in director, less than 10% enrollment change, less than 20% staff turnover, no change in corporate sponsorship, etc… And lastly, Compliance History should either demonstrate a very low level of non-compliance or a constant regulatory compliance improvement over time. See following equation.

LQS = ∑RCS + ∑RAR + ∑KIR + ∑QIS + ∑Complaints +∑KI Criteria + ∑Compliance History

The RCS should have a score either at a 7 or 5 level, Full or Substantial regulatory compliance. This should occur both at the aggregate and individual rule levels.
The RAR should have no violations.
The KIR should have no violations.
The QIS should have a score in the range of 28-36+ on the Quality Scale.
There should be no complaints about the program.
All KI Criteria should have been met.
And the Compliance History should have very few non-compliances and always be improving

Differential Monitoring x Integrated Monitoring Matrix

Presented below is a proposed matrix depicting the relationship of integrated monitoring (IM) and differential monitoring (DM). Both integrated monitoring and differential monitoring have been discussed separately in previous posts. This 2 x 2 matrix provides a visualization of how the two approaches potentially intersect and can be used in tandem. Just as a reminder, differential monitoring involves doing an abbreviated inspection instead of a full licensing inspection utilizing either a risk assessment or a key indicator predictor methodology. Integrated monitoring is the infusion of quality elements into a given set of rules or regulations, most likely through the use of ***Caring for Our Children***.

The 2 x 2 matrix provides four possibilities: A = Regulatory Compliance (RC) rules which results in a full inspection; B = Program Quality (PQ) standards which results in a full inspection; C = Regulatory Compliance rules which results in an abbreviated (Abb) inspection; and D = Program Quality standards which results in an abbreviated inspection. The essence of any model should be its relevance and hopefully its elegance. The below 2 x 2 matrix is relevant because the two monitoring approaches are the most salient ways of conducting inspections for human services regulatory administration. But hopefully it is also elegant in its simplicity and direct modeling, that we will need to see if it resonates with licensing administrators & researchers as well as regulatory scientists.

This matrix should help licensing administrators think through the appropriate use of these various approaches and what it means when combining them. Differential monitoring is an encouraged approach via CCDBG/CCDF, integrated monitoring is too new to make a determination regarding its use. I think it is the next evolution of program monitoring related to regulatory science and administration by providing a balance and continuum along the quality domain with regulatory compliance/licensing as the foundation of this continuum. **TRLECE: The Role of Licensing in Early Care and Education** has developed a wonderful research brief on program monitoring which highlights how states are using differential monitoring that I highly recommend (The Report).

		IM	
		RC	**PQ**
DM	**Full**	***A***	***B***
	Abb	***C***	***D***

IM x DM Matrix

Also, you may want to consult ***Licensing Measurement and Monitoring Systems: Regulatory Science Applied to Human Services Regulatory Administration*** which has a chapter about integrated monitoring (Licensing Measurement and Monitoring Systems ebook)

The Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix for Licensing Decision Making, Validation, Reliability, and Differential Monitoring Studies

This research abstract will take the Confusion Matrix which is a well-known metric in the decision-making research literature and refocus it on regulatory science within the context of the definition of regulatory compliance and licensing measurement. It will also deal with the policy implications of this particular metric. In this abstract, it is proposed that the Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix (UCM) is a fundamental building block to licensing decision making. The 2 x 2 matrix has been written about in several posts in this blog and is the center piece for determining key indicator rules, but it is also a core conceptual framework in licensing measurement and ultimately in program monitoring and reviews.

The reason for selecting this matrix is the nature of licensing data, it is binary or nominal in measurement. Either a rule/regulation is in compliance or out of compliance. Presently most jurisdictions deal with regulatory compliance measurement in this nominal level or binary level. There is to be no gray area, this is a clear distinction in making a licensing decision about regulatory compliance. The UCM also takes the concept of Inter-Rater Reliability (IRR) a step further in introducing an uncertainty dimension that is very important in

licensing decision making which is not as critical when calculating IRR. It is moving from an individual metric to a group metric (See Figures 1 & 2) involving regulatory compliance with rules. The key pieces to the UCM are the following: the decision (D) regarding regulatory compliance and actual state (S) of regulatory compliance. Plus (+) = In-compliance or Minus (-) = Out of compliance. So, let's build the matrix:

Table 1: Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix (UCM) Logic Model

UCM Matrix Logic		**Decision (D) Regarding**	**Regulatory Compliance**
		(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance
Actual State (S) of	(+) In Compliance	Agreement	Disagreement
Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance	Disagreement	Agreement

The above UCM matrix demonstrates when agreement and disagreement occur which establishes a level of certainty (Agreement Cells) or uncertainty (Disagreement Cells). In a perfect world, there would only be agreements and no disagreements between the decisions made about regulatory compliance and the actual state of regulatory compliance. But from experience, this is not the case based upon reliability testing done in the licensing research field in which a decision is made regarding regulatory compliance with a specific rule or regulation and then that is verified by a second observer who generally is considered the measurement standard.

Disagreements raise concerns in general, but the disagreements are of two types: false positives and false negatives. A false positive is when a decision is made that a rule/regulation is out of compliance when it is in compliance.

Not a good thing but its twin disagreement is worse where with false negatives it is decided that a rule/regulation is in compliance when it is out of compliance. False negatives need to be avoided because they place clients at extreme risk, more so than a false positive. False positives should also be avoided but it is more important to deal with the false negatives first before addressing the false positives.

Let's look at this from a mathematical point of view in the following matrix. In order to better understand the above relationships and determine when ameliorative action needs to occur to shore up the differences between the agreements and disagreements, it is easier to do this mathematically than trying to eyeball it.

Table 2: Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix (UCM) Math Model

UCM Matrix Math Model		**Decision (D) Regarding**	**Regulatory Compliance**	**Totals**
		(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance	
Actual State (S)	(+) In Compliance	A	B	Y
Of Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance	C	D	Z
Totals		W	X	

Formulae based upon above: Agreements = (A)(D); Disagreements = (B)(C); Randomness = sqrt ((W)(X)(Y)(Z))

UCM Coefficient = ((A)(D)) - ((B)(C)) / sqrt ((W)(X)(Y)(Z)) in which a coefficient closer to 1 indicates agreement (certainty) and a coefficient closer to –1 indicates disagreement (uncertainty). A coefficient closer to 0 indicates

randomness. Obviously, we want to see (A)(D) being predominant and very little in (B)(C) which are false positives and negatives where decisions and the actual state of regulatory compliance are not matching. If (WXYZ) is predominant then there is just randomness in the data. Also, not an intended result.

The reason for even suggesting this matrix is the high level of dissatisfaction with the levels of reliability in the results of program monitoring reviews as suggested earlier. If it were not so high, it would not be an issue; but with it being so high the field of licensing needs to take a proactive role in determining the best possible way to deal with increasing inter-rater reliability among licensing inspectors. Hopefully, this organizational schema via the UCM Matrix will help to think through this process related to licensing measurement and monitoring systems.

$$UCM = ((A)(D)) - ((B)(C)) / sqrt((W)(X)(Y)(Z))$$

The above formula provides a means to calculate when action needs to be taken based upon the respective UCM coefficients. A UCM coefficient from +.25 to +1.00 is in the acceptable range; +.24 to -.24 is due to randomness and needs to be addressed with additional inter-rater reliability training; -.25 to –1.00 indicates a severe disagreement problem that needs to be addressed both in reliability training and a full review of the targeted rules/regulations to determine if the specific rule needs additional clarification.

Table 3: Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix (UCM) Licensing Decision Coefficient Ranges

UCM Coefficient	**Licensing Decision**

+.25 to +1.00	Acceptable, No Action Needed, In or Out of Regulatory Compliance Verified through mostly Agreements. (Generally, 90% of cases)
+.24 to -.24	Random, Agreements + Disagreements, Needs Reliability Training. (Generally, 5% of cases)
-.25 to –1.00	Unacceptable, Mostly Disagreements, Needs Training & Rule/Regulation Revision. (Generally, 5% of cases)

Figure 1: Kappa Coefficient



Figure 2: Uncertainty-Certainty Coefficient

$$\phi = \frac{ad - bc}{\sqrt{(a+b)(c+d)(a+c)(b+d)}}$$

$$\phi = \sqrt{\frac{\chi^2}{n}}$$

Let's provide an example of how this could work. A standard/rule/regulation that is common is the following:

Do all caregivers/teachers and children wash their hands often, especially before eating and after using the bathroom or changing diapers?

This is obviously an observation item where the licensing staff would observe in a sample of classrooms in a child care center for a set period of time. During their observations, there were several opportunities where the necessary behavior was required, and the staff complied with the rule and washed their hands. So, on the surface this specific rule was in compliance and there would appear to be full compliance with this rule based upon the observation.

A second scenario is where the observation is made, and the licensing staff observes the child care staff not washing their hands on several occasions. Then this specific rule would be out of compliance, and it would be duly noted by the licensing staff. These two scenarios establish a certain level of certainty during this observation session. However, there are other outcomes, for example, possibly one of the classrooms that was not observed had the opposite finding than what was observed in these particular classrooms. If data were being aggregated and a specific percentage was to be used the final decision about this rule could be different. Now we are getting into the uncertainty cells of the matrix where a false positive or negative could be the result. The licensing staff records the rule as being in compliance when in reality it is not = false negative or the rule is recorded as being out of compliance when in reality it is in compliance = false positive.

Another example which involves either Random Clinical Trials (RCT) or the use of abbreviated inspections (AI) and the results from these two interventions. The decision making in both RCT and AI is basically the same. We want to make sure that the results match reality. Every time an abbreviated

review is done the following four regulatory compliance results should occur based upon the UCM matrix: 1) no additional random non-compliance is found; 2) there are no false negatives (abbreviated review finds no non-compliance but in reality there is); 3) when there is non-compliance found in abbreviated inspections, other related non-compliance is found; and 4) lastly the level of false positives (abbreviated review finds non-compliance but in reality there are no other related non-compliances) is kept to a minimum. This last result based upon copious research is that it is difficult to obtain but as the regulatory science moves forward hopefully this will become more manageable.

Hopefully these above examples provided some context for how the Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix (UCM) can be used in making specific licensing decisions based upon the regulatory compliance results.

Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix for Validation and Reliability Studies

The purpose of this part of this research abstract is to explore the possibility of utilizing the Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix (UCM) in validation and reliability studies in licensing decision making. The UCM has been proposed for use in licensing decision making but this would be an extension of this thinking to studies that involve validating licensing decisions such as when key indicators are used in comparison with comprehensive reviews of rules, and in reliability studies to determine individual inspector bias in regulatory compliance.

The basic premise of the UCM is that individual decision-making matches reality. When it comes to regulatory

compliance decision making a 2 x 2 matrix can be drawn with the possible outcomes as is indicated in the following table:

Table 4

UCM Matrix Logic		**Decision Regarding**	**Regulatory Compliance**
		(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance
Actual State of	(+) In Compliance	Agreement (++)	Disagreement (+-)
Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance	Disagreement (-+)	Agreement (--)

In using this table, the hope is that the decision regarding regulatory compliance matches the actual state of compliance where the coefficient is as close to +1.0 as possible, in other words, perfect agreement. So, the agreement cells are heavily weighted. We do not want to see all the cells, both agreement and disagreement cells, equally weighted. That would indicate a random response rate and a coefficient close to 0.0.

But there is another possibility which involves bias on the part of the licensing inspector in which they have certain biases or tendencies when it comes to making regulatory compliance decisions about individual rules. So, it is possible that decisions made regarding regulatory compliance could be either overall (+) positive In-Compliance or (-) negative Not-In-Compliance when in reality the actual state of compliance is more random.

When this occurs, the coefficient falls off the range category and is not between 0 and +/-1.0 because there is no variance detected in the data. It is always biased either positively or negatively.

The UCM can be used for both reliability and validity testing as suggested in the above. Just look for different results. For validity, false positives and negatives should either be eliminated or reduced as well as possible and the remaining results should show the typical diagonal pattern as indicated by the agreement cells.

For reliability, the same pattern should be observed as in the validity testing above but there is an additional test in which bias is tested for. Bias will be ascertained if the patterns in the results indicate a horizontal or vertical pattern in the data with little or no diagonal indication. Bias can be found at the individual inspector level as well as at the standard level or the actual state of compliance.

In both reliability and validity testing, random results in which each of the cells are equally filled are not a desirable result either. The following tables 5-10 depict the above relationships with results highlighted in red:

Table 5

Valid & Reliable Results	(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance
(+) In Compliance	Agreement (++)	Disagreement (+-)
(-) Not In Compliance	Disagreement (-+)	Agreement (--)

Table 6

Random Results	(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance
(+) In Compliance	Agreement (++)	Disagreement (+-)
(-) Not In Compliance	Disagreement (-+)	Agreement (--)

Table 7

Positive Bias Results Individual	(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance
(+) In Compliance	Agreement (++)	Disagreement (+-)
(-) Not In Compliance	Disagreement (-+)	Agreement (--)

Table 8

Negative Bias Results Individual	(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance
(+) In Compliance	Agreement (++)	Disagreement (+-)
(-) Not In Compliance	Disagreement (-+)	Agreement (--)

Table 9

Positive Bias Results Standard	(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance
(+) In Compliance	Agreement (++)	Disagreement (+-)
(-) Not In Compliance	Disagreement (-+)	Agreement (--)

Table 10

Negative Bias Results Standard	(+) In Compliance	(-) Not In Compliance
(+) In Compliance	Agreement (++)	Disagreement (+-)
(-) Not In Compliance	Disagreement (-+)	Agreement (--)

Tables 5 – 10 demonstrate the different results based upon individual response rates when making regulatory compliance decisions about rules. Table 5 is what needs to be attained and tables 6 – 10 need to be avoided. Only in table 5 are false negatives and positives eliminated or avoided. In tables 6 –

10, false negatives and/or false positives are introduced which is not desirable when making validity or reliability decisions.

Table 6 results clearly indicate that a great deal of randomness has been introduced in the regulatory compliance decision making in which the individual licensing inspector decisions do not match reality. Tables 7 and 8, demonstrate bias in the decision-making process either positively (inspector always indicates in compliance) or negatively (inspector always indicates out of compliance). It is also possible that the standard being used has bias built into it, this is less likely but is still a possibility. The results in Tables 9 and 10 demonstrate where this could happen.

All these scenarios need to be avoided and should be monitored by agency staff to determine if there are patterns in how facilities are being monitored.

Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix for Differential Monitoring Studies

The purpose of this part of the research abstract is to explore the possibility of utilizing the Uncertainty-Certainty Matrix (UCM) not only in validation and reliability studies in licensing decision making but also with differential monitoring studies. The UCM has been proposed for use in licensing decision making but this would be an extension of this thinking to studies that involve validating licensing decisions such as when key indicators are used in comparison with comprehensive reviews of rules, and in the development of risk rules as part of the risk assessment methodology. This new Differential Monitoring 2x2 Matrix can also be used to

depict the relationship between full and substantial regulatory compliance and the nature of rulemaking.

The basic premise of the DMM: Differential Monitoring Matrix is similar to the original thinking with the UCM but there are some changes in the formatting of the various cells in the matrix (see Table 11). When it comes to regulatory compliance decision making a 2 x 2 matrix can be drawn with the possible outcomes as is indicated in Table 11 where each individual rule is either in (+) or out (-) of compliance. Also, there is the introduction of a high regulatory compliant group (+) and a low regulatory compliant group (-) which is different from the original UCM.

Table 11

DMM Matrix	High Group (+)	Low Group (-)
(+) Rule is In Compliance	(++)	(+-)
(-) Rule is Not In Compliance	(-+)	(--)

By utilizing the format of Table 11, several key components of differential monitoring can be highlighted, such as key indicators and risk assessment rules, as well as the relationship between full and substantial regulatory compliance.

Regulatory compliance is grouped into a high group (+), generally this means that there is either full or substantial regulatory compliance with all rules. The low group (-) usually has 10 or more regulatory compliance violations.

Individual rules being in (+) or out (-) of regulatory compliance is self-explanatory.

Tables 12-18 below will demonstrate the following relationships:

Table 12 depicts the key indicator relationship between individual rules and the high/low groups as indicated in red. In this table, the individual rule is in compliance with the high group and is out of compliance with the low group. This result occurs on a very general basis and should have a .50 coefficient or higher with a p value of less than .0001.

Table 13 depicts what most rules look like in the 2x2 DMM. Most rules are always in full compliance since they are standards for basic health and safety for individuals. This is especially the case with rules that have been weighted as high-risk rules. Generally, one never sees non-compliance with these rules. There will be a substantial number of false positives (+-) found with high-risk rules but that is a good thing.

Table 14 depicts what happens when full compliance is used as the only criterion for the high group. Notice that the cell right below (++) is eliminated (-+). This is highly recommended since it eliminates false negatives (-+) from occurring in the high group. As will be seen in Table 5, when substantial compliance is used as part of the high group sorting, false negatives are re-introduced. If possible, this should be avoided, however in some cases because of the regulatory compliance data distribution it is not always possible where not enough full compliant programs are present.

Table 15 depicts what occurs when substantial compliance is used as part of determining the high group. False negatives can be reintroduced into the matrix which needs to be either eliminated or reduced as best as possible. If substantial compliance needs to be used in determining the high group, then there is a mathematical adjustment that can be made which will impact the equation and essentially eliminate false negatives mathematically (see the research note at the end of this research abstract).

Table 16 depicts what happens if the individual rule is particularly difficult to comply with. Both the high performers as well as the low performers are out of compliance with the rule.

Table 17 depicts a situation where the programs are predominantly in a low group with few at full or substantial regulatory compliance which is indicative of poor performing programs. Very honestly, this is generally not seen in the research literature, but it is a possibility and one to be in tune with.

Table 18 depicts a terrible individual rule which predicts just the opposite of what we are trying to do with programs. Obviously, this rule would need to be rewritten so that it fits with the essence of regulatory compliance in helping to protect individuals.

The following tables 12-18 will depict the above relationships with results highlighted in red:

Table 12

Key Indicators	High Group (+)	Low Group (-)

(+) Rule is In Compliance	(++)	(+-)
(-) Rule is Not In Compliance	(-+)	(--)

Table 13

Risk Rules	High Group (+)	Low Group (-)
(+) Rule is In Compliance	(++)	(+-)
(-) Rule is Not In Compliance	(-+)	(--)

Table 14

Full Compliance	High Group (+)	Low Group (-)
(+) Rule is In Compliance	(++)	(+-)
(-) Rule is Not In Compliance		(--)

Table 15

Substantial Compliance	High Group (+)	Low Group (-)
(+) Rule is In Compliance	(++)	(+-)
(-) Rule is Not In Compliance	(-+)	(--)

Table 16

Very Difficult Rule	High Group (+)	Low Group (-)
(+) Rule is In Compliance	(++)	(+-)
(-) Rule is Not In Compliance	(-+)	(--)

Table 17

Poor Performing Programs	High Group (+)	Low Group (-)
(+) Rule is In Compliance	(++)	(+-)
(-) Rule is Not In Compliance	(-+)	(--)

Table 18

Terrible Rule	High Group (+)	Low Group (-)
(+) Rule is In Compliance	(++)	(+-)
(-) Rule is Not In Compliance	(-+)	(--)

Tables 12 – 18 demonstrate the different results based on the relationship between individual regulatory compliance and if a program is either a high performer or a low performer. These tables are provided as guidance for understanding the essence of differential monitoring and regulatory compliance which has various nuances when it comes to data distributions. This research abstract hopefully can be used as a guide in determining from a data utilization point of view how to make important regulatory compliance policy decisions, such as: ***which rules are excellent key indicator rules, which are performing as high risk rules, importance of full compliance, what to do when substantial compliance needs to be employed, are there difficult rules to comply with, how well are our programs performing, and do we have less than optimal rules that are in need of revision.***

Research Note:

Over the past decade in doing research on the Regulatory Compliance Key Indicator Metric (RCKIm) it has become very clear that false negatives needed to be controlled for because of their potential to increase morbidity and mortality. When dealing with regulatory compliance and full compliance as the threshold for the high grouping variable in the 2 x 2 Regulatory Compliance Key Indicator Matrix (RCKIm) (see matrix below in Table 19), false negatives could be either eliminated or reduced to the point of no concern.

However, if substantial compliance rather than full compliance is used as the threshold for the high grouping variable in the 2 x 2 Regulatory Compliance Key Indicator Matrix (RCKIm) this becomes a problem again. There is the need to introduce a weighting factor. In utilizing the RCKIm, the following equation/algorithm is used to produce the Fiene Coefficient (FC):

$$FC = ((A)(D)) - ((B)(C)) / sqrt\ (WXYZ)$$

This RCKIm needs to be revised/updated to the following to consider the need to again eliminate false negatives being generated by the results of the equation/algorithm; this can be accomplished by cubing C:

$$FC^* = ((A)(D)) - ((B)(C^3)) / sqrt(WXYZ)$$

By this simple adjustment to cube (C = False Negatives) it will basically eliminate the use of any results in which a false negative occurs when substantial compliance is determined.

The table below (Table 19) displays the variables of the Regulatory Compliance Key Indicator Matrix (RCKIm).

Table 19: RCKIm	High RC Group	RC Low Group	
KI In Compliance	A	B	Y
KI Violations	C^3	D	Z
Totals	W	X	

In the above examples, FC can be used when the High RC Group is at full regulatory compliance, but FC* needs to be used when the High RC Group is including substantial as well as full regulatory compliance. By using both equations/algorithms, it better deals with the results of the Regulatory Compliance Theory of Diminishing Returns.

The results should clearly show that only positive (+) coefficients will become Regulatory Compliance Key Indicators versus those rules that do not show any relationship to overall regulatory compliance (0), but now the negative (-) coefficients will more clearly show when any false negatives appear and clearly not include them as Regulatory Compliance Key Indicators (see Figure 2). This is a major improvement in the Regulatory Compliance Key Indicator methodology which clearly demonstrates the differences in the results. It provides a gateway in regulatory compliance data distributions where substantial regulatory

compliance is heavily present while full regulatory compliance is not. This could become a problem as the regulatory science field moves forward with the use of the Regulatory Compliance Theory of Diminishing Returns.

Regulatory Compliance Scale Weighted (RCSw)

The Regulatory Compliance Scale (RCS) has been proposed as a more effective and efficient means of measuring regulatory compliance rather than adding up the number of regulatory violations for a specific program. It improves upon the measurement of rules by moving from a nominal to an ordinal level. However, it does have a limitation in that in its present form it is based upon violation frequency data that are not weighted according to the specific risk factor of each rule. This brief technical research abstract will attempt to correct this deficiency by moving the scaling of the RCS by considering weighting and relative weighting of rules based upon the risk of rule non-compliance for clients.

In the following table, three models for RCS are displayed based upon violation data, weights, and relative weights. Violation (Violations Model) data have no weights or another way of thinking about it as all rules have the same weight, a weight of one (1); weighting (Weights Model) is done on a Likert Scale generally using 1-9 scaling, while relative weighting (RWeights Model) is a new approach utilizing the Fibonacci Sequence which uses a 1-100 scaling.

Table Comparing the Regulatory Compliance Scale Models

				Models	
Scale	***Compliance***	***Risk Level***	***Violations***	***Weights***	***RWeights***
7	**Full**	**None**	**0**	**0**	**0**
5	**Substantial**	**Low**	**1-3**	**1-3**	**1-3**
3	**Medium**	**Medium**	**4-9**	**4-6**	**4-19**
1	**Low**	**High**	**10+**	**7+**	**20+**

With these new models proposed, it tremendously improves upon the Regulatory Compliance Scale (RCS) by considering the relative risk of each rule which was not the case in the original RCS. The new RCSw versions do this through the weights or relative weights applied to each rule based upon an equal Weighting Schema or a Fibonacci Sequence. The addition of the weights to the RCS should make for a more accurate determination of regulatory compliance. However, these new models have not been tested empirically as of this writing. It is planned in the upcoming year to test them out side by side and compare them to the original RCS Violation Model.

Uniform, Differential, and Integrated Program Monitoring

This technical section demonstrates the key similarities and differences amongst uniform, differential, and integrated monitoring. The similarities and differences will be depicted in the following table. The table depicts how each monitoring approach addresses the specific key element presented. Explanations are provided after the summary table. It builds off several other papers* that dealt with regulatory compliance paradigms and the relationship between regulatory compliance and program quality; but this paper deals more specifically with program monitoring systems that are being utilized within the human services.

Program Monitoring System's Key Elements Comparison

Key Element	Uniform	Differential	Integrated
1Risk	Absolute	Relative	Relative
2Rules	Equal	Not equal	Not the focus
3Quality Standards	Not the focus	Not the focus	Focus
4Measurement	Nominal	Nominal	Ordinal
5Approach	Everyone gets the same	Based on need	Open ended
6Weights	None	Equal or Relative	Balance
7Philosophy	Do no harm	Do no harm	Do things well
8Data distribution	Linear	Non-linear	Linear
9Risk/Performance	Risk	Risk	Performance
10Scaling	100 or 0	100 or 0	100 - 0
11Function	Gatekeeper	Gatekeeper	Enabler
12Quality	Structural	Structural	Process
13Compliance	Full	Substantial	Full/Substantial

1. Risk is defined in a uniform monitoring system with all rules at an equal risk level. In differential monitoring, risk changes to be more relative in that certain rules are more of a concern than others. In an integrated monitoring system with the influx of quality elements, risk is relative also because of this added dimension.
2. Rules are either created equally, which is the case with uniform monitoring systems, or they are not equal in differential monitoring systems where weights are employed to demonstrate the relative risk of specific rules. In integrated monitoring systems, rules are replaced with standards and specific health and safety rules are not the focus.
3. Quality standards are the focal point of integrated monitoring systems but not so with uniform and differential monitoring systems which emphasize health and safety rules.
4. Measurement at both the uniform and differential monitoring systems levels are nominal in which either a rule is in or out of compliance. Integrated monitoring systems which deal with program quality are generally at an ordinal, Likert level of measurement.
5. The approach of each of the monitoring systems varies from everyone gets-the- same for uniform monitoring systems to based-on-need for differential monitoring systems, and more open ended for integrated monitoring systems where both compliance and quality are equally important.
6. Weights are not an issue with uniform monitoring systems because all rules are dealt with equally and

therefore are dealt with as strictly violation data with an equal weight. With differential monitoring systems that is not the case and is the focal point in this approach where weights can be either equally applied with a Likert Scale with an equal interval or relatively applied with the Fibonacci Sequence. Integrated monitoring systems have a more balanced approach dependent upon the balance of compliance and quality.

7. Philosophy for the uniform and differential monitoring systems deals more with rules and "do no harm" while integrated monitoring systems focus on quality and "doing good" or best practices.
8. Data distributions are linear when dealing with uniform and integrated monitoring systems, but differential monitoring systems have clearly demonstrated a non-linear data distribution based upon the theory of regulatory compliance**.
9. Risk/Performance plays out with risk being predominant with uniform and differential monitoring systems but performance being predominant with integrated monitoring systems where quality is central.
10. Scaling is at a nominal level in both uniform and differential monitoring systems where measurement is based upon either being in or out of compliance with rules (100 or 0). Integrated monitoring systems are at an ordinal level where various levels of quality are being assessed (100 –0).
11. Function of the approach is either as gatekeeper at both the uniform and differential monitoring systems levels and as an enabler at the integrated monitoring systems where it is more of an open system rather than a closed

system which is based upon licensing. Open systems are represented by voluntary systems dealing with quality standards.

12. Quality at the uniform and differential monitoring systems is more structural than process-oriented, as with integrated monitoring systems. In legal terms, it is the difference between soft data in the case of process-oriented quality as versus hard data in the case of structural quality.
13. Compliance needs to be fully or 100% compliant in uniform monitoring systems, which is not the case in differential monitoring systems where substantial regulatory compliance is sufficient based upon the results of the theory of regulatory compliance**. With integrated monitoring systems there is more of a balancing act between full and substantial compliance levels.

Hopefully, this clarifies how the various program monitoring systems used within the human services are similar and different. This paper should be read with the other technical research papers dealing with regulatory compliance and program quality paradigms which enhance upon these above stated elements.

References:

***Regulatory Compliance Monitoring Paradigms and the Relationship of Regulatory Compliance/Licensing with Program Quality: A Policy Commentary, Fiene, 2023. *Journal of Regulatory Science*. (**https://doi.org/10.21423/JRS-V10A239**).**

****Treatise on Regulatory Compliance, Fiene, 2019. *Journal of Regulatory Science* https://doi.org/10.21423/jrs-v07fiene**

Regulatory Compliance Scale Trials and Tribulations

The Regulatory Compliance Scale (RCS) was introduced several years ago and has been used in a couple of validation studies for differential monitoring and regulatory compliance's ceiling effect phenomenon. RCS buckets or thresholds were statistically generated based upon these studies, but it is time to validate those buckets and thresholds to determine if they are really the best model in creating a regulatory compliance scale. Since proposing the RCS, there has been a great deal of interest from jurisdictions in particular from Asian and African nations. Additional statistically based trials were conducted, and this brief report is the compilation of those trials over the past year.

The data used are from several jurisdictions that are part of the international database maintained at the Research Institute for Key Indicators Data Laboratory at Penn State University focusing on program quality scores and rule violation frequency data. These data from the respective databases were recoded into various thresholds to determine the best model. The jurisdictions were all licensing agencies in the US and Canada geographically dispersed where both regulatory compliance and program quality data was obtained from a sample of early care and education programs.

METHODOLOGY

The following methodology was used starting with the original RCS buckets/thresholds of Full, Substantial, Medium, and Low regulatory compliance:

Table 1: RCS Models used for analyses

RCS				Models			
		Original	***1***	***2***	***3***	***4***	***5***
	Full	100	100	100	100	100	100
Scaling	***Substantial***	99-98	99-97	99-97	99-98	99-98	99-97
	Medium	97-90	96-90	96-93	97-95	97-85	96-85
	Low	89>	89>	92>	94>	84>	84>

Five alternate models were used to compare the results to the original RCS. The numbers indicate the number of violations subtract from a perfect score of 100. Full regulatory compliance indicates no violations and a score of 100 on the scale. The next bucket of 99-98 indicates that there were 1 or 2 regulatory compliance violations which resulted in a 99-98 score on the scale. This logic continues with each of the models.

The scale score was determined in the following manner: Full Regulatory Compliance = 7; Substantial Regulatory Compliance = 5; Medium Regulatory Compliance = 3; and Low Regulatory Compliance =1. This rubric is how the original RCS scaling was done on a Likert type scale similar to other ECE program quality scales, such as the Environmental Rating Scales.

RESULTS

The following results are correlations amongst the respective RCS Models from Table 1 compared to the respective jurisdictions program quality tool (Quality1-3): ERS or CLASS Tools.

Table 2: RCS Model Results compared to Quality Scales

RCS results	Models	Quality1	Quality2	Quality3
Jurisdiction1	**RCS0**	**.26***	**.39***	**.39***
	RCS3	.21	.32*	.33*
	RCS5	.20	.36*	.33*
Jurisdiction2	**RCS0**	**.76****	**.46****	**---**
	RCS3	.12	-.07	---
	RCS5	.18	-.02	---
	RCSF1	.55**	.29*	---
	RCSF2	.63**	.34	---
Jurisdiction3	RCS0	.19	.18	.16
	RCS3	**.21**	**.21**	**.15**
	RCS5	.18	.16	.07
	RCSF1	.17	.17	.10
	RCSF2	.18	.18	.19
Jurisdiction4	RCS0	.24*	---	---
	RCS3	.28*	---	---
	RCS5	**.30***	**---**	**---**
	RCSF1	.21	---	---
	RCSF2	.29*	---	---
Jurisdiction5	RCS0	.06	-.02	.07
	RCS3	.06	-.01	.05
	RCS5	**.08**	**.00**	**.09**
	RCSF1	.00	-.03	.05
	RCSF2	.05	-.03	.05

*Statistically significant .05 level;

**Statistically significant .01 level.

In the above table starting under Jurisdiction2, two new models were introduced based upon the Fibonacci Sequence (Fibonacci1 = RCSF1; Fibonacci2 = RCSF2) and their model structure is in the following Table 3. The reason for doing this is that the Fibonacci Sequence introduces additional variation into the scaling process.

Table 3: RCS Fibonacci Models

RCS Fibonacci			Models	
		Original	***Fibonacci1***	***Fibonacci2***
	Full	100	100	100
Scaling	***Substantial***	99-98	40	90
	Medium	97-90	20	20
	Low	89>	13	13

A second series of analyses were completed in comparing the RCS models with program quality (Quality1) by running ANOVAs with the RCS models as the independent variable and program quality as the dependent variable (Table 4). The reason for doing this was the nature of the data distribution in which there was a ceiling effect phenomenon identified which would have had an impact on the correlations in Table 2 above. All results are significant at $p < .05$ level with the exception of Jurisdiction2.

Table 4: ANOVAs Comparing the RCS Models with Program Quality

Jurisdictions	Model	Level 1	Level 3	Level 5	Level 7
Jurisdiction1	**RCS0**	**2.85**	**3.34**	**4.05**	**3.40**
	RCS3	3.24	3.23	4.05	3.40
	RCS5	2.73	3.32	3.77	3.40
Jurisdiction2	RCS0	4.81	4.31	4.80	4.10
	RCS3	**4.59**	**4.25**	**4.80**	**4.10**
	RCS5	---	4.26	4.64	4.10
Jurisdiction3	RCS0	4.59	4.68	4.86	4.87
	RCS3	**4.38**	**4.67**	**4.83**	**4.87**

	RCS5	4.38	4.83	4.83	4.87
Jurisdiction4	RCS0	37.81	37.01	44.28	41.96
	RCS3	36.57	38.60	44.28	41.96
	RCS5	**33.46**	**36.53**	**43.10**	**41.96**
Jurisdiction5	RCS0	3.93	4.17	4.28	4.07
	RCS3	4.02	4.24	4.28	4.07
	RCS5	**3.75**	**4.13**	**4.26**	**4.07**

DISCUSSION

Based upon the above results, it appears that the original RCS model proposed in 2021 is still the best model to be used, although the Fibonacci Sequence model is a close second in some of the jurisdictions. This model will need further exploration in determining its efficacy as a replacement or enhancement to the original RCS Model.

The bottom line is that the original RCS Model is as good as any and no other model is consistently better than all the rest. The RCS Model does have a slight edge over Regulatory Compliance Violation RCV frequency counts in some jurisdictions but not in others. It is much easier to interpret the relationship between quality and the RCS models than it is to interpret the results from the quality scores and the RCV data distribution. So, the recommendation would be for licensing agencies to think in terms of using this new scaling technique in one of its model formats in order to determine its efficacy. Pairing up RCS and RCV data side by side by licensing agencies would be important studies to determine which approach is the better approach.

The below graphic depicts the relationship between the RCS Models (0, 3, 5) when compared to the quality scores (1-6)

clearly showing the ceiling effect and diminishing returns effect phenomenon so typical of regulatory compliance data when compared to program quality. These graphs are from the first three jurisdictions (1, 2, 3) from the above tables.



The Theory of Regulatory Compliance, Regulatory Compliance Scale, and Differential Monitoring

The theory of regulatory compliance has been proven in multiple studies over the past four decades and has been utilized extensively in the creation of differential monitoring and its spin off methodologies of risk assessment and key indicators. In fact, differential monitoring would not have been possible without the theory of regulatory compliance because the paradigm which it replaced, one of one-size-fits-all monitoring or uniform monitoring would have predominated. However, with the theory of regulatory compliance which introduced the importance of substantial regulatory compliance and the search for the right rules/regulations that made a difference in client's lives, rather than emphasizing more or less regulations or rules.

The theory of regulatory compliance has another application when it comes to regulatory compliance measurement in helping to move the licensing field from a nominal based measurement strategy to one of ordinal based measurement. The new measurement strategy is the Regulatory Compliance Scale (RCS) and it is depicted in the following table.

RCS	*Compliance*	*Risk*	*Model*	*Model*
Scale	***Level***	***Level***	***Violations***	***Weights***
7 = A	**Full**	**None**	**0**	**0**
5 = B	**Substantial**	**Low**	**1-3**	**1-3**
3 = C	**Medium**	**Medium**	**4-9**	**4-6**
1 = D	**Low**	**High**	**10+**	**7+**

The above table needs some explanation. The first column is the proposed ordinal scale similar to other scales utilized in the program quality measurement research literature on a 1 – 7 Likert Scale where 7 = Full Regulatory Compliance, 5 = Substantial Regulatory Compliance, 3 = Medium Regulatory Compliance, and 1 = Low Regulatory Compliance. It could also be thought of as an Alpha Scale of A – D as well. The next column has the compliance levels that run from full 100% regulatory compliance to low regulatory compliance. The third column depicts the risk level from none to high which corresponds with the compliance levels. The next two columns depict two models, one unweighted and one in which the rules are weighted with corresponding weights. These models are based upon the two prevailing approaches to rank ordering rules or regulations in the research literature.

The following figures will depict how the scale was conceived based upon empirical evidence in the various studies supporting the theory of regulatory compliance. The first figure shows the actual individual violation data (LSTOTAL) of the programs compared to their corresponding ECERS (ECERSPS) scores. There is not a significant relationship between the two as depicted in the graphic.



The following figure below depicts what occurs when the individual violation data are grouped according to the theory of regulatory compliance in which a substantial compliance category is introduced and the data are moved from a nominally based metric to an ordinally based metric of full, substantial, medium, and low regulatory compliance

categories (RCS). This grouping more clearly reflects the theory of regulatory compliance. It also clearly demonstrates the ceiling effect which is an outcome of the theory of regulatory compliance in which substantial and full regulatory compliance levels are basically equivalent when quality is taken into account. Or at the extreme level which is depicted here where full regulatory compliance quality scores are actually lower than the substantial regulatory compliance quality scores. A footnote about the figures and the scaling: the scales for the first figure are on a lower to higher progression but the higher LSTOTAL represents higher non-compliance where the second figure is also based upon lower to higher scaling but the higher scores represent increased quality (ECERSPS) and increased regulatory compliance (RCS). So, in reading the change from left to right, the two figures are reversed images of each other. This is just a quirk of the scaling and not a mistake in the plotting of data.

The RCS has been pilot tested in both the non-weighted and weighted models and based upon these studies it appears to be more effective in distinguishing quality amongst the various categories rather than utilizing violation count data. This would be a significant improvement when it comes to licensing measurement. Of course, additional replication studies need to be completed before it would be recommended as a new Scale to be used for making licensing decisions.



The above figure is dramatically different than the prevailing paradigm which predicts a linear relationship between regulatory compliance and quality which is the paradigm of a uniform monitoring approach. The above results clearly indicate a reconsideration with the introduction of substantial regulatory compliance as an important contributor to overall quality if not the most important contributor to quality. As

stated above, these findings have been replicated in several studies conducted over the past several decades.

This would be a major paradigm shift in moving from individual violation data counts to an ordinal scale metric but it does warrant additional research. The problem with individual violation data is that it doesn't take into account the relative risk of the individual rule which could place clients at increased risk of morbidity or mortality. Risk assessment has worked really well when coupled with key indicators in the differential monitoring approach and it appears to be an asset in the development of a Regulatory Compliance Scale (RCS).

Could the Fibonacci Sequence be Superior to the Equal Interval Weighting for Risk Assessment?

Risk assessment (RA) has generally used a 3 x 3 matrix similar to the one depicted in Table 1 below where an equal interval weighting was utilized in describing the nine cells that constituted the 3 x 3 matrix. The matrix considers the risk levels and compares that to the probability of the actual risk occurring, so there were nine possibilities (1 – 9).

Table 1: RA Likert Absolute Equal Interval Weighting

Uniform Risk		Risk Levels		
		High	Medium	Low
Probability of Occurring	High	9	6	3
	Medium	8	5	2
	Low	7	4	1

More recently, a proposed change has been suggested to utilize the Fibonacci Sequence in place of the equal interval weighting. There is a great deal of merit in considering this because the Fibonacci Sequence has an interesting effect in introducing a differential risk function rather than a more uniform risk as is the case with equal interval weighting as depicted in table 1. In table 2, it is clear the Fibonacci Sequence has a tremendous impact on the increasing value of the various risk/probability cells within the 3 x 3 matrix. It mirrors the increasing risk, which considers the risk already present in the previous cell and then increases it by the next numeric increase. This increase changes markedly as the risk/probability goes up by a factor of over 10 at the highest risk level. The nine cells range from 1 – 100 rather than 1 - 9.

Table 2: RA Relative Weighting: The Fibonacci Sequence

Differential Risk		Risk Levels		
		High	**Medium**	**Low**
Probability of Occurring	**High**	100	13	3
	Medium	40	8	2
	Low	20	5	1

The above sequence is not an exact Fibonacci Sequence and modifies the cell results at the high-risk levels to accentuate this level. A potential proposal is depicted in table 3 in how this could play out with the weighting of rules/regulations related to the health and safety of clients and their relative risk of mortality and/or morbidity because of non-compliance with such rules/regulations either directly or indirectly.

Table 3: RA Relative Weighting: The Fibonacci Sequence Proposal

Differential Risk		Risk Levels		
		Direct (Causality)		**Indirect (Correlation)**
		Mortality	**Morbidity**	**Mortality/Morbidity**
		High	Medium	Low
Probability of Occurring	High	100	13	3
	Medium	40	8	2
	Low	20	5	1

This proposal needs to be tested and compared to the more prevalent equal interval weighting approach to see if it is a better predictor in identifying the risk level of rules and regulations when it comes to health and safety.

About the Author:

After a long career in governmental service and academia, mostly in Pennsylvania; and consulting, nationally and internationally, Dr Rick Fiene continues to write and research about regulatory science topics (such as measurement, instrument development, math & statistical modeling, differential monitoring, risk assessment, key performance indicators) as they relate to early care and education, the human services, and has been delving into other social sciences as well.

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